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INTRODUCTION

This article is a companion piece to the major project

undertaken by Ronald Collins and David Hudson to assess the
Roberts Court and free speech, which anchors this issue of the
Brooklyn Law Review.1 Five years ago, I did a similar study for

Brooklyn Law School's Journal of Law and Policy, entitled "Free
Speech Matters: The Roberts Court and the First Amendment."2
The paper was presented as part of a symposium that assessed the
first ten years of the Roberts Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence, from 2006 to 2016. When this Brooklyn Law Review
symposium was being planned, I thought it might be interesting,
and hopefully illuminating, to focus on the five-year period since
2016 to assess whether the Roberts Court had stayed on the same
strong First Amendment path that I mapped out five years earlier.
As I described the Court's handiwork back then as of 2016:
For a ten-year period, the Roberts Supreme Court may well have been
the most speech-protective Court in a generation, if not in our history,
extending free speech protection on a number of fronts and rebuffing
claims by government and its allies to limit such protections. Yet these
free speech rulings have drawn fire from critics, both on and off the
Court, contending that the decisions are inconsistent with the
democratic and egalitarian purposes of the First Amendment and that
they overprotect free speech at the expense of competing and important
values, such as equality, privacy, decency, or democracy. And in the
trenches of everyday life, censorship and suppression of speech seem
more the rule than the exception, both at home and abroad. Free speech
3
is thus at a crucial constitutional and cultural crossroad.

t Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. The author wishes to thank Courtney
Clark, Brooklyn Law School Class of 2021, for her exceptional research assistance on this article.
And, as always, thanks to my wife, Ann Ray, for all of her help and support.
1 Ronald K.L. Collins & David L. Hudson, Jr., The Roberts Court-Its First
Amendment Free ExpressionJurisprudence:2005-2021, 87 BROOK. L. REV. 5 (2021).
2 Joel M. Gora, Free Speech Matters: The Roberts Court and the First
Amendment, 25 J.L. & POL'Y 63, 63-129 (2016).
3 Id. at 64-65 (footnotes omitted).
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In the intervening five years, how has the Court's support
for First Amendment rights and values been impacted by: (1) the
intensified criticism of the Roberts Court's First Amendment
work, as reflected in many of the presentations at this
symposium; (2) the attacks on the Roberts Court, including
serious proposals to "pack" the Court; (3) the turbulence of the
Trump presidency; (4) the arrival of three new justices; and (5)
the frequently remarked cautionary inclinations of the chief
justice to prefer incremental shifts in doctrine and to preserve
the institutional stature of the Court by trying to avoid
politically controversial rulings?4 Here is the CliffsNotes answer:
the Court has basically and remarkably stayed the course,
compiled an astounding .800 batting average in affirming First
Amendment free speech claims, has sometimes hedged and
trimmed its willingness to recognize and protect new rights, but
on many occasions has significantly strengthened and extended
free speech protections.b Finally, and woefully, where the
condition of our free speech culture is concerned, I think the
situation is even more troubling than I assessed it to be five
years ago. The culture of free speech has buckled and weakened
under the weight of political correctness, cancel culture, the
antiracism reckoning, and the widespread and pervasive
censorship by social media, producing a general reign of
suffocating systemic censorship.6
I.

THE ROBERTS COURT BASELINE: THE FIRST TEN YEARS
OF FREE SPEECH MATTERS, 2006-2016

So, more specifically, what were the main themes that
made the Roberts Court, during its first decade, the most speechprotective, First Amendment-friendly Court, perhaps in history?
Those rights reaffirmed and strengthened during the Roberts
Court era stem from the magnificent provision which guarantees
our religious freedom, our freedom of speech and of the press,
and the right of the people to assemble and petition the
4 See David Leonhardt, A Supreme Court, Transformed, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/06fbriefing/supreme-court-donald-trump.html [https/
perma.cc/C445-PRHJ]; Adam Liptak, How Conservatives Weaponized the First Amendment,
N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2018), https:/www.nytimes.com/2018/06/30/us/politics/first-amendmentconservatives-supreme-court.html [httpsJ/perma.cc/Q87W-QJQ9].
5 A list of the twenty cases surveyed is set forth as an appendix to this article.
6 See generally Alec Greven, Why a Culture of Free Expression Demands Tolerance,
INST. FOR FREE SPEECH BLOG (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.ifs.org/blog/free-expression-culturedemands-tolerance/ [https://perma.cc/RP93-FHVS] (discussing the idea that "a culture of free
expression goes beyond the law," requiring reinforcement for the open exchange of ideas from
private actors and individuals, yet the current social environment in America appears to prevent
this free expression out of fear of the social consequences resulting from this "cancel culture").
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government for a redress of grievances.? In my view, in its first
decade, the Roberts Court travelled on the fast lane of the
highway of political freedom, ensuring those rights and
advancing the core First Amendment values and principles.
First, in a series of cases, the most well-known of which is
Citizens United v. FEC,8 the Court reaffirmed that protecting
political speech from government censorship and repression is at
the heart of the First Amendment's purposes in American
democracy, and limits on political spending are limits on political
speech that can rarely be justified. The Court has also reaffirmed
a theme that transcends politics, namely, that another core
purpose of the First Amendment is to guarantee that the people,
not the government, get to determine what they want to say and
how they want to say it-a principle that applies in a number of
settings including those characterized as artistic, corporate, and
commercial.9 In all of those areas, the Roberts Court emphasized
that the First Amendment's powerful presumption against
government censorship is a recognition of individual and group
freedom, liberty, and autonomy to choose what to say and what to
hear.O Likewise, the Court was extremely vigilant against laws
where government seeks to regulate speech on the basis of content,
and especially on the basis of disapproved viewpoints." The Court
similarly rebuffed efforts to create new nonspeech categories, even
to punish reprehensible, "worthless" speech.12 As much as possible,
the Court tried to give categorical protection to almost all speech
content and to resist ad hoc balancing of speech versus claims of
harm from the speech.13 As an earlier Court once said about the
choice between free speech and censorship: "It is precisely this kind
of choice ... that the First Amendment makes for us."14 In short,
and with very few exceptions, government has to be studiously
neutral where speech is concerned.15
7 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8 Citizens United v. Fed.

Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
9 See, e.g., Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 805 (2011) (giving First
Amendment protection to violent video games companies).
10
See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339-40 (discussing the right of individuals
and groups to determine how they want to express their views on candidates for elective office).
11
See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 171-73 (2015) (striking down
town ordinance that imposed more stringent restrictions on signage displayed in public areas
depending on the content on the sign); Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297-98 (2019)
(striking down federal trademark law that barred "immoral" or "scandalous" marks as
viewpoint based on its face and in its enforcement).
12
See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010) (invalidating, as
overbroad, statute which punished depictions of animal cruelty).
13 Id. at 460-61.
14 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
770 (1976).
15 See Gora, supra note 2, at 66-69.
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THE ROBERTS COURT'S MOST RECENT FIVE YEARS: FREE

SPEECH MATTERS EVEN MORE, 2016-2021

In the last five years, the Roberts Court has consistently
reaffirmed almost all of the core free speech themes explained
above and extended others, such as the safeguards against
compelled speech.16 The Court has given free speech rights added
protection on the internet and has continued to protect the flow
of information to the public in a variety of contexts, carrying
forward the antipaternalism theme of earlier years and Courts."
In addition, the Court has both reaffirmed the core First

Amendment protection for offensive speech, reducing even
further the power of government to tell us what we can and
cannot say, and generally continued to take a firm stand against
restrictions of speech based on content.1 8 And the Court has
rebuffed government efforts to place speech into unprotected or
less protected categories.19

The Court also produced some welcome extensions or
expansions of free speech rights in certain areas. As indicated
above, for almost a decade, from 2006 to 2015, the Court

invalidated on First Amendment grounds almost every campaign
finance law that it considered, the most well-known being Citizens
United.20 Then, for the next five years, the Roberts Court kept a low
16 See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138
S. Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018) (holding that public sector unions cannot compel nonmember
employees to pay union fees).
17 See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751, 1757-65 (2017) (finding that
an Asian rock group is free to choose an ethnically-negative name in order to show they
are in control of their identity). This reflects the more general antipaternalism which the
Roberts Court has embodied in limiting the ability of the government to determine what
people can say and what information they may use to say it.
18 See, e.g., id. at 1763 ("We have said time and again that 'the public expression
of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some
of their hearers."' (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969))); Iancu v. Brunetti,
139 S. Ct. 2294, 2296 (2019) (striking down ban on "immoral" or "scandalous" trademarks).
19 See, e.g., Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1757-65 (rejecting arguments that the
trademark could be banned because it constituted "government speech" or subsidized
speech or commercial speech).
20 See Thomson v. Hebdon, 140 S. Ct. 348 (2019) (state limits on campaign
contributions); McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014) (federal
limits on aggregate campaign contributions by individuals); Ariz. Free Enter. Club's
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 753-55 (2011) (state matching funds
provision for publicly-financed candidates); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558
U.S. 310, 362-66 (2010) (federal limits on corporate independent expenditures); Davis v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 729-30 (2008) (federal limits that burden candidate's
personal campaign contributions); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551
U.S. 449, 481-82 (2007) (plurality opinion) (federal limits on corporate issue advocacy
expenditures that mention candidates); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236-37 (2006)
(plurality opinion) (state limits on campaign contributions by individuals, groups, and
candidates). The only case deviating from the pattern was Williams-Yulee v. FloridaBar,
575 U.S. 433, 444 (2015), which upheld, 5-4, a prohibition on personal campaign
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profile on campaign finance law type issues-until the last day of
the 2020 term when it decided an important issue on the First
Amendment right of associational privacy in Americans for
Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta (AFP).21 Though the case did not
involve campaign finance law directly,22 the Court handed down a
very powerful ruling protecting the core right to join and support

organizations without having to tell the government.23 In the
process, the Court opened the door to challenges to disclosure
regimes in the campaign finance area as well.
An equally pleasant surprise to free speech fans came when
the Court, for the first time in over fifty years since its landmark
Tinker decision on student free speech rights,24 reaffirmed and
extended the free speech rights of high school students to express
their views on social media free from official approval or sanction.25
The Court in Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. held that a
student's off-campus social media post including vulgar language
criticizing the school after not making the varsity cheerleading
team was protected student speech under the First Amendment,
given a consideration of several factors.26
In the other vital First Amendment vineyard-the
protections of freedom of religion-the Roberts Court continued
its almost unbroken string of cases both protecting the free
exercise of religion against government restrictions and
impositions and expanding (despite establishment clause
objections) the amount of religious expression that can occur on
or with government property. The net effect is more protected
religious expression than before.27
But the last five years have also witnessed considerable
pushback to these positive developments in various forums.
Chief among the charges, from on and off the Court, are that the
Court is: (1) overprotecting free speech at the expense of other

contribution solicitation by judicial office candidates, even in writing. One possible
explanation for the deviation is that the Court is particularly sensitive to judicial ethics.
21 Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021).
22 Rather, the case involved a challenge to California's requirement that
charitable organizations disclose to the state their large donors. Id. at 2379.
23 Ams. for Prosperity, 141 S. Ct. at 2388-89.
24 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1969).
26 See Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. Levy ex rel. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2044 (2021).
26 Id. at 2046-48. The factors included that it was off-campus speech on her
own time, dealt with a valid issue of school policy, and the vulgarity was communicated
to a limited number of friends, was not directed at any one person, and did not cause any
substantial disruption at the school. But the opinion made it quite clear that it was not
a broad Magna Carta for student speech on the internet, but rather a multifactor, ad hoc
approach that might yield different results with different facts.
27 See discussion infra Section I.G.
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values;28 (2) "weaponizing" the First Amendment in the
impermissible service of conservative policy goals and at the
expense of those individuals and institutions without wealth or
power; 29 and (3) "Lochnerizing" the law by using the First
Amendment to limit the government's power to regulate the
enormous range of business and commercial activity.0
Ironically, there has been a sea change shift in the support
for free speech. Many liberals and progressives who used to embrace
the values of free speech now question them, and conservatives who
used to resist free speech now often support its principles.31 When I
was an American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) lawyer, my
colleagues and I tried to weaponize free speech against government
controls as much as possible, on behalf of groups and individuals
across the political and cultural spectrum, including Communists,
Socialists, civil rights activists, women's rights protestors, anti-war
protestors, commercial speakers, sexual speakers, Klansmen, and
Nazis. Our fundamental view was that the protections of the First
Amendment were and had to be universal and indivisible; they had
to be available to all or they would be available to none. Free speech
was the handmaiden of democracy, not its antagonist. More
information would allow for an informed citizenry capable of selfgovernance and individuals capable of self-realization. I hope the
Court will not yield to the criticism that it is too "absolutist" about
free speech, that its rulings hinder rather than help democracy, that
its decisions unduly favor business interests against progressive
concerns. I hope, instead, that the Court will continue on that strong
free speech path and not take the road toward greater government
control of our First Amendment rights.
Finally, a pivotal figure in consistently affording such
protections has been Justice Anthony Kennedy, who, in my mind,
is a true First Amendment hero. Not only did he write the
landmark Citizens United decision protecting core political speech

/

28 See, e.g., Ams. for Prosperity, 141 S. Ct. at 2392 (Sotomayor, J., joined by
Breyer & Kagan, JJ., dissenting).
29 See infra text accompanying notes 80-90; Liptak, supra note 4.
30 See infra text accompanying notes 78-80. The "Lochnerizing" charge of course
refers to the Court's 1905 decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), where the Court
used the due process clause to give robust judicial review and often to thereby invalidate new
laws regulating workplace labor relations and other economic and business matters.
31 See Arthur D. Hellman, The Supreme Court's Two Constitutions: A First Look at
the 'Reverse Polarity" Cases, 82 U. Prrr. L. REV. 273, 308-11 (2020) (discussing the
phenomenon of "reverse polarity" in several contexts including the First Amendment);
Genevieve Lakier, The Great Free-Speech Reversal, ATLANTIC (Jan. 27, 2021),
27
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/01/first-amendment-regulation/6178
reversed
have
conservatives
and
liberals
how
(explaining
[https://perma.cc/SLZ8-PABX]
positions on speech protections for corporations); Liptak, supra note 4 (noting "liberals who
once championed expansive First Amendment rights are now uneasy about them").
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against government suppression, but he has also safeguarded the
internet as a true forum for a myriad of voices and views.32 Add to
that the phenomenon of his writing for the Court majority on all
four of the major decisions that comprise an unprecedented canon
of gay rights law-sounding some of the same themes of personal
liberty that inform his First Amendment rulings-and you have a
true libertarian champion of both political freedom and personal
liberty.3 In a recent 2018 case, Justice Kennedy summed up his
libertarian constitutional philosophy in the following way:
The California Legislature included in its official history the
congratulatory statement that the Act was part of California's legacy of
"forward thinking." But it is not forward thinking to force individuals to "be
an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view
[they] fin[d] unacceptable." It is forward thinking to begin by reading the
First Amendment as ratified in 1791; to understand the history of
authoritarian government as the Founders then knew it; to confirm that
history since then shows how relentless authoritarian regimes are in their
attempts to stifle free speech; and to carry those lessons onward as we seek
to preserve and teach the necessity of freedom of speech for the generations
to come. Governments must not be allowed to force persons to express a
message contrary to their deepest convictions. Freedom of speech secures
freedom of thought and belief. This law imperils those liberties. 34

Now let me turn to the major cases of the past five years
that embody the Roberts Court's continued powerful commitment
to First Amendment values.
A.

The ProudestBoast: The Roberts Court'sProtection of
the Freedom to Express the Thoughts that We Hate

One of the strongest pro-free speech themes of the Roberts
Court is that offensive, hurtful speech is nonetheless protected by
the First Amendment. The Court strongly sounded that theme in
2011 in Snyder v. Phelps, the funeral protest case where anti-gay
demonstrators shouted and displayed anti-gay slurs and
expressions and found refuge in the First Amendment.36 In its most

32 See, e.g., Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (holding that
denial of internet and social media privileges to a former sex offender violated the First
Amendment because of the crucial role of the internet in the exercise of free speech rights
in the contemporary world).
33 The four gay rights cases are Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); and
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
34 Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379 (2018)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
35 See generally Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (holding that use of anti-gay
slurs and epithets as part of a public demonstration in a public forum on issues of public
concern cannot serve as the basis for an award of damages for intentional infliction of
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recent five years, the Roberts Court reaffirmed that powerful
anticensorship theme, ruling, in effect, that there is no categorical
hate speech exception to the First Amendment.
In the 2017 case, Matal v. Tam, the Court unanimously
struck down a section of the Lanham Act, a federal law that banned
"the registration of trademarks that may 'disparage . .. or
bring ... into contemp[t] or disrepute' any 'persons, living or dead."'36
A rock band comprised of Asian-Americans wanted to call
themselves "The Slants," a derogatory racial slur, in order to
"reclaim" the term and drain its denigrating force.37 Justice Alito's
opinion held that the law "violates the Free Speech Clause .... It
offends a bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may not be
banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend."38 Allowing
such a theory
strikes at the heart of the First Amendment. Speech that demeans on
the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability or any
other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free
speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express "the
9
thought that we hate." 3

Or as Voltaire supposedly put it: "I disapprove of what you say, but
I will defend to the death your right to say it."40 In addition, the Court
also rejected various categorical bases for suppressing the speech
such as the government speech doctrine and the government
subsidy doctrine.4'
Equally important is that the Court's most liberal
justices joined a separate opinion, written by Justice Kennedy,
which reaffirmed the "fundamental principle of the First
Amendment that the government may not punish or suppress
speech based on disapproval of the ideas or perspectives the

emotional distress and the need to prevent even extremely hurtful and offensive speech must
yield to free speech requirements).
36 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (alterations in original) (quoting
15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)).

37 Id. at 1754.
38

Id. at 1751.

39 Id. at 1764 (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929)

(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
40 Justice Breyer referenced this in his opinion in the Mahanoy case:
Thus, schools have a strong interest in ensuring that future generations
understand the workings in practice of the well-known aphorism, "I disapprove
of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." (Although
this quote is often attributed to Voltaire, it was likely coined by an English
writer, Evelyn Beatrice Hall.)
Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. Levy ex rel. B.L., 141
majority opinion).
41 See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1757-61.

S.

Ct. 2038, 2046 (2021) (Breyer, J.,
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speech conveys."42 Likewise, he said, there can be no heckler's
veto as a way around this principle: "The Government may not
insulate a law from charges of viewpoint discrimination by tying
censorship to the reaction of the speaker's audience."43
Finally, to underscore that point, Justice Kennedy concluded:
A law that can be directed against speech found offensive to some
portion of the public can be turned against minority and dissenting
views to the detriment of all. The First Amendment does not entrust
that power to the government's benevolence. Instead, our reliance
must be on the substantial safeguards of free and open discussion in
a democratic society.44

This sounds another continuing Roberts Court theme, namely, that
it is the people, not the government, who get to decide what speech
they want to espouse.
These issues of protecting hateful speech are difficult
ones. But at the core of the principles of free speech is the right
of the most loathsome speakers to communicate their message
in a peaceful, nonviolent way, without forceful interference and
threats by private vigilante groups and with the most rigorous
official protection. From Skokie to Charlottesville, the most
important lesson to be learned is that if we do not protect the

free speech rights of everyone, we will wind up having no free
speech rights for anyone.45 But, though sad to say, I do not know
if a majority of the public believes that.46 So, we are on a collision

course between what the Court powerfully tells us free speech
requires and what the public thinks the government should be
able to do to suppress hateful speech. Maybe that is why some
leaders find it easier to condemn the deplorables than to "defend

to the death" their right to speak deplorably.47

42

Id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

4

Id. at 1766.

4

Id. at 1769.
In the 1970s "Skokie case," the Illinois ACLU defended the right of a Nazi
group to march in the predominantly Jewish Chicago suburb of Skokie, Illinois. See
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978) (invalidating city ordinances designed to
prevent the Nazis from marching). In the 2017 "Charlottesville case," the Virginia ACLU
defended the right of a "Unite the Right" group to march in Charlottesville, Virginia, see
Kessler v. City of Charlottesville, 441 F. Supp. 3d 277 (W.D. Va. 2020), though later
violence ensued.
46 See Robert Corn-Revere, The Anti-Free Speech Movement, 87 BROOK. L. REV.
145, 184-89 (2021) (citing several episodes in recent years of violent and forceful
suppression, ironically on college campuses, of speakers whose views the assailants
condemn, with the violent censorship justified on the ground that the offending ideas
must be stamped out at all costs).
4 See supra note 40. During the 2016 presidential campaign, Hillary Clinton
famously commented that Donald Trump's supporters could be put into a
"basket of deplorables":
45
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More recently, the Court reaffirmed these core
anticensorship principles in Iancu v. Brunetti, a case involving yet
another provision of the Lanham Act on trademark laws-one
which precluded official recognition of a trademark which
comprised "immoral[] or scandalous" matter. 48 But, concededly,
there was some slippage in the Court's unanimous support-as

seen in Tam-for protecting offensive or ugly speech. In this case,
a clothing manufacturer had been denied the right to trademark
the trade name, "FUCT."49 Again, a majority of the Court, in an
opinion written by Justice Kagan, agreed that the statute violated
the strict principle against government viewpoint censorship:

positive ideas are permitted, negative ones are banned.60 And in
practical application, the dangers of such viewpoint favoritism
were apparent, with examples of a number of positive trademarks
being allowed, while a number of negative ones on the same topics,
e.g., drug use, were prohibited.61 A clearer case of government
viewpoint discrimination cannot be found.62 Nor could the Court
reinterpret the statute to only restrict "vulgar" words, i.e.; those
which were lewd, sexually explicit, or profane, even assuming that
would cure the viewpoint discrimination.63
Justice Alito strongly supported the Court's decision
because of his concern with the widespread censorship of
offensive or hateful speech:
Viewpoint discrimination is poison to a free society. But in many
countries with constitutions or legal traditions that claim to protect
freedom of speech, serious viewpoint discrimination is now tolerated,
and such discrimination has become increasingly prevalent in this
country. At a time when free speech is under attack, it is especially
important for this Court to remain firm on the principle that the First
Amendment does not tolerate viewpoint discrimination. We reaffirm
that principle today.64

"You know, to just be grossly generalistic, you could put half of Trump's
supporters into what I call the basket of deplorables. Right?" she said to
applause and laughter. "The racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic,
Islamaphobic-you name it. And unfortunately there are people like that. And
he has lifted them up."
Amy Chozick, Hillary Clinton CallsMany Trump Supporters Deplorables,'andG.O.P. Pounces,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/us/politics/hillary-clintonbasket-of-deplorables.html [https://perma.cc/SXD7-738Ql.
48 See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019) (alteration in original)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)).
49

Id.

60 Id. at 2299.
51 Id. at 2300.
62 See id. at 2300-01.

a3 Id. at 2301-02.
54 Id. at 2302-03 (Auto, J., concurring).
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But Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Breyer and
Sotomayor, dissented.66 This is somewhat surprising, since the
chief justice is a self-proclaimed strong supporter of free speech and
has rarely dissented from one of the Court's cases honoring First
Amendment claims.66 These dissenters agreed that the "immoral"
criterion was facially unconstitutional, but they thought the word
"scandalous" in the statute dould be interpreted as limited to three
categories of vulgarity-lewd, sexually explicit, and profane-and
that such an application would not violate the First Amendment 7
Justice Breyer, using his well-known balancing approach, agreed
and reasoned that the interests protected by the First Amendment
would not be disproportionately harmed by such a statute and that
the government should be able to ban, for example, the use of ugly
racial epithets in this circumstance.8 And even Justice Alito, who
voted to strike down the "immoral or scandalous" statute,
supported a statute limited to vulgarity.69 But it is hard to reconcile
these views with the famous 1971 "Fuck the Draft" case, which
found First Amendment protection for the use of such vulgar
language in public.O The dissenters in Brunetti also seem to be in
tension with Mahanoy, the recent high school social media speech
case where the Court ruled a student could not be punished for a
private social media message which used the word "Fuck" liberally
in communications.61 In any event, these three Roberts Court
precedents-Snyder, Tam, and Brunetti-remainstrong sentinels
against laws banning hate speech or other forms of scurrilous,
offensive, or hurtful communications.
B.

That Fixed Star: The Government Cannot Compel a
Person to Speak the Government's Message

One of the Court's most abiding landmark cases, decided
at the height of wartime and patriotic fervor in 1943 and that
overruled a case decided barely three years earlier, is West

66 Id. at 2303-04 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 2304-08 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2308-18
(Sotomayor, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66 Ronald Collins & David Hudson, John Roberts: Mr. First Amendment,
SCOTUSBLoG, (July 21, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/07/johnroberts-mr-first-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/D4RV-WW4K].
67 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
68 Id. at 2304-08 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
69 Id. at 2302-03 (Alito, J., concurring).
60 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 25-26 (1971).
f1 See Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. Levy ex rel. B.L. 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2043, 2048
(2021); see infra Section I.E.
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Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.62 The case
involved compulsory student flag salutes imposed in public
schools that Jehovah's Witnesses children objected to, claiming
that the compulsion to utter such words was destructive to their
freedom of speech and religion.63 The Court agreed that it
violated the rights of the children and their parents to force the
children to participate in a ceremonial flag salute which
completely conflicted with their religious beliefs.64 The Court's
reasoning was embodied in a quote familiar to most students of
the First Amendment:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any
circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.
We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the
flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their
power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the
purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from
all official control.65

The decision shows that sometimes the most humble David can
defeat the most powerful Goliath when the former is armed with
the protections of the First Amendment.66
Over the years, the Barnette rule against compelled
speech has been applied to protect individual freedom of
speech,67 freedom of the press,6 8 and to protect institutions as
well as individuals.69 In its early years, the Roberts Court
unanimously rejected a compelled speech claim by law schools
that objected to being required to host military recruiters on
campus at a time when the military policies were anti-gay.70 But
the Court has become more vigilant in recent years in terms of
guarding against government compelled speech. Indeed, on
consecutive days in June 2018, the Court handed down two
powerful, though sharply contested, 5-4, conservative/liberal
See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943).
63 Id. at 628-30.
64 Id. at 642.
65 Id. (footnote omitted).
62

66 See Hemant Mehta, The Complicated History of the Pledge of Allegiance |
Episode
3,
FRIENDLY
ATHEIST
(June
29,
2019),
https://friendlyatheist.patheos.com/2019/07/29/the-complicated-history-of-the-pledge-ofallegiance-episode-3/ [https://perma.cc/SB8Q-WCTV].
67 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
68 See Mia. Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
69 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986).
70 See Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 48-49 (2006).

2021]

FREE SPEECH STILL MATTERS

207

split decisions, safeguarding the right not to be compelled to
speak against one's beliefs and the right not to financially
support speech against one's beliefs.71
The first case involved a California statute that regulated
pro-life crisis pregnancy centers and required these clinics to notify
women of the availability of abortions and other health care
services at other clinics, or to notify women if the clinics were not
allowed to provide medical services.72 The Court, in an opinion by
Justice Thomas, held that the compelled speech requirement
improperly burdened the centers' First Amendment rights.73
Though not explicitly invoking the Barnette case, the Court in effect
applied its principles by finding that the California law could not
pass muster under strict scrutiny.74 Nor was it justifiable on the
rejected theory that there is a category of "professional speech"
deserving lesser protection against government regulation:
The licensed notice is a content-based regulation of speech. By
compelling individuals to speak a particular message, such notices
"alte[r] the content of [their] speech." Here, for example, licensed clinics
must provide a government-drafted script about the availability of statesponsored services, as well as contact information for how to obtain them.
One of those services is abortion-the very practice that petitioners are
devoted to opposing. By requiring petitioners to inform women how they
can obtain state-subsidized abortions-at the same time petitioners try
to dissuade women from choosing that option-the licensed notice plainly
75
"alters the content" of petitioners' speech.

And another feature of the law improperly "impose[d] a
government-scripted, speaker-based disclosure requirement
that is wholly disconnected from California's informational
interest" and that seriously burdened the group's efforts to
express their own protected message. 76
Justice Kennedy, speaking for himself, the chief justice,
and Justices Alito and Gorsuch, did squarely invoke the
principles against improperly compelled speech:
This law is a paradigmatic example of the serious threat presented when
government seeks to impose its own message in the place of individual
speech, thought, and expression. For here the State requires primarily
pro-life pregnancy centers to promote the State's own preferred message
advertising abortions. This compels individuals to contradict their most
71
See Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2365-78
(2018) (decided on June 26, 2018); Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps.,
Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2462 (2018) (decided on June 27, 2018).

72 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2377-78.
73 Id. at 2378.
74 Id. at 2375.
75 Id. at 2371 (citations omitted).
76 Id. at 2377-78.
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deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in basic philosophical, ethical, or
religious precepts, or all of these. And the history of the Act's passage and
its underinclusive application suggest a real possibility that these
individuals were targeted because of their beliefs.7 7

The four liberal dissenters, in an opinion by Justice Breyer,
rejected the specific holding of improperly coerced speech and
raised the broader charge that the majority was trying to
"Lochnerize" its review of what are no more than every day
economic or business regulations.78 In other words, the intensive
scrutiny given to the clinic requirements is alleged to recall
Lochner's deep scrutiny of economic, business, and labor
regulations, an approach long discredited and discarded by the
Court.79 The specter of Lochner is raised to suggest that, since so
much of human activity involves speech, the Court is opening the
door to applying scrutiny to that whole swath of normally
unexceptional government regulation of business and commerce.
From "Lochnerize" to "weaponize," the Janus v. AFSCME,
Council 31 case decided the next day was the finale to a campaign
waged across several years and cases to undermine the rule that
members of a public sector bargaining unit, who declined to join
the civil servants' union, could be compelled to pay their fair share
of the costs of collective bargaining between the union
representatives and state or local government officials.0 At issue
in this case was an Illinois law which required nonmembers of
public employee unions to pay a so-called agency fee relating to the
union's collective bargaining activities that benefited all
employees, including the dissenting non-union members.81 The
practice was handily upheld.as constitutional in the 1977 Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education decision, which also held that
dissenting non-union members could not be compelled to pay for
the public union's political (and other similar) activities.82 Such a
requirement would have violated their right not to be compelled to
support speech they oppose.

' A majority in Janus held that the same immunity applied
to compulsory payment of the agency fees.83 As he had in the two
previous pertinent cases, Justice Alito wrote the opinion for the
Court, ruling that there was no compelling interest that could
77 Id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
78 Id. at 2382-83 (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, & Kagan, JJ., dissenting).

79
So

See id. at 2381-82.
See Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138

S. Ct.
2448 (2018).
81 Id. at 2460-61.
82 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), overruled by Janus,
138 S. Ct. 2448.
83 Janus, 138. S. Ct. at 2478, 2486.
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sustain a law that compelled a private person to subsidize the
speech of other private speakers on matters of substantial public
concern. 84 Justice Alito centrally relied on the core principles of
Barnette, especially noting the harm to personal autonomy by
forcing a person to espouse views they abhor.85 Indeed, the Court
said that compelling speech was actually worse than prohibiting it:
Perhaps because such compulsion so plainly violates the
Constitution, most of our free speech cases have involved restrictions on
what can be said, rather than laws compelling speech. But measures
compelling speech are at least as threatening.
Free speech serves many ends. It is essential to our democratic form
of government, and it furthers the search for truth. Whenever the Federal
Government or a State prevents individuals from saying what they think
on important matters or compels them to voice ideas with which they
disagree, it undermines these ends.
When speech is compelled, however, additional damage is done. In
that situation, individuals are coerced into betraying their convictions.
Forcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find
objectionable is always demeaning, and for this reason, one of our
landmark free speech cases said that a law commanding "involuntary
affirmation" of objected-to beliefs would require "even more immediate
and urgent grounds" than a law demanding silence.
Compelling a person to subsidize the speech of other private speakers
raises similar First Amendment concerns.8 6

The Janus ruling attracted powerful dissents. Justice
Sotomayor objected that earlier Roberts Court precedent marked a
"troubling development in First Amendment jurisprudence over
the years"87 and had wrongly encouraged and enabled the Court "to
wiel[d] the First Amendment in ... an aggressive way"88 in most
inappropriate cases like this. Justice Kagan lamented the undoing
of the delicate and fair balance in public union employer relations
that Abood had facilitated. Reaffirming a recurring Justice Breyer
theme, she said that the Court's aggressive use of the First
Amendment in the broad areas of normal everyday government
activity and regulation is a danger to democracy and a disservice
to the First Amendment:
There is no sugarcoating today's opinion. The majority overthrows a
decision entrenched in this Nation's law-and in its economic life-for over
40 years. As a result, it prevents the American people, acting through their
84 See id. at 2464. In other words, a private person cannot be forced to pay for
another's political advocacy that the private person does not share or endorse.
See id.
86 Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
86

87 Id. at 2487 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 2487 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
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state and local officials, from making important choices about workplace
governance. And it does so by weaponizing the First Amendment, in a way
that unleashes judges, now and in the future, to intervene in economic and
regulatory policy.8 9

Her sharp criticism provided the occasion for a front-page story,
accumulating many similar criticisms against the Roberts Court's
robust application and defense of the First Amendment's
protections and guarantees. 90

Two other high-profile cases had intimations of compelled
speech concerns, but were resolved on free exercise of religion clause
grounds. Those are the well-known wedding cake baker case 91 and
an equally important public adoption services case decided this
year. 92 Both cases involved the conflict between gay rights and samesex marriage, on the one hand, and freedom from compelled speech
or compelled religious practices on the other. In both cases, the
objectors raised both compelled speech and freedom of religion
claims, and the cases were decided in their favor, but arguably
without a definitive resolution of the difficult constitutional clash.93
Finally, on the compelled speech theme, three other cases
from the October 2020 term have resulted in protecting people or
institutions from having to serve as a platform for speech they
oppose. First, a California regulation that allowed farmworker
union organizers to enter the premises of agricultural property on

a regular basis year-round to try to unionize the work force was
held to constitute a per se compensable taking under the Fifth
Amendment takings clause, which requires compensation or
desistence.94 Although in the past, the Court had upheld California
laws permitting leafletting-i.e., the activity of handing out or
distributing pamphlets or leaflets in public places-at privately
owned shopping centers, despite compelled speech arguments, in

the farm workers case, the Court, 6-3, found the mandatory
imposition too close to the core of the takings clause concerns to
sustain the entry.95
Similarly, in the cable public access channel case, discussed
in Section III.C, the Court refused to treat a private nonprofit cable
channel operator as the equivalent of government and rejected a
claimed right of First Amendment supervision of the company,

89
90
91
92
93
9

Id. at 2501

(Kagan, J., dissenting).
See Liptak, supranote 4.
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
For more detail on these cases, see infra Section II.G.
See Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2071-72 (2021).
95 Id. at 2068, 2074-77.
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effectively absolving it from being compelled to open its forum
against its editorial will.96
Finally, in AFP, the charitable donor disclosure case
discussed above, the Court's ruling spared the charity from being
compelled to identify its major donors to the state attorney general,
also a blow against government-compelled speech.97 In less direct
ways, these three cases served libertarian ends by enforcing
constitutional barriers against government compulsion to speak or
to permit access to unwanted speakers.
C.

"Above All Else ...
on Content

":

No Restrictionson Speech Based

In 1972, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote: "But, above
all else, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content."98 In Police Departmentof the City
of Chicago v. Mosley, he used that principle to strike down a
Chicago law which banned any picketing or demonstrations
outside a school, except for those involving a labor dispute.99 In
that powerful single sentence is embedded a core pillar of free
speech: no government censorship. Of course, there are
exceptions to that pillar, such as laws against obscenity, but the
core principle remains: the people, not the government, get to

decide what gets to be said.
Four years after Mosley, in 1976, the Court would embed
that principle in two disparate cases-one dealing with the vital
issues of political speech, the other with the no less vital issues of
where to get reasonably priced prescription drugs. In Buckley v.
Valeo, in striking down government limits on how much candidates

and causes could spend to promote their political messages, the
Court wrote: "In the free society ordained by our Constitution it is
not the government, but the people-individually as citizens and
candidates and collectively as associations and political
committees-who must retain control over the quantity and range
of debate on public issues in a political campaign."oo And a few
months later, in a case dealing with the seemingly more mundane
matter of advertising drug prices, the Court made a similar point
in rejecting government arguments that people needed to be
protected against getting such information for their own good:
See Manhattan Cmty.

Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019).
See Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2385 (2021).
98 Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
99 Id.
100 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976) (per curiam).
96

97
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There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic
approach. That alternative is to assume that this information is not in
itself harmful, that people will perceive their best interests if only they
are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open
the channels of communication rather than to close them.... It is
precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing
information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the
First Amendment makes for us.101

The legacy of cases like these has carried forward to
modern times in the doctrine that, in general, laws that prohibit
or burden speech on the basis of its content are presumptively
unconstitutional and must be subject to strict scrutiny. The
same is true, even more so, in the case of the biased first cousin
of content-based laws: viewpoint-discriminatory laws which
punish or disfavor one point of view while enabling and allowing
the opposite contentions.102

We have seen that the Roberts Court has taken this
principle most seriously. In a 2011 case involving government

limits on access to and use of pharmaceutical information, the
Court, speaking through Justice Kennedy, observed that the law
restricted speech on the basis of its content, barred some
speakers but not others, and was even viewpoint based-thus
violating the First Amendment.103 And in another significant
case, the Roberts Court in 2015 invalidated a local ordinance
which regulated outdoor signs, but made a variety of exceptions
for those of a certain content.104 The city claimed it had no malign
purposes but was just trying to act reasonably.105 The Court's
response was clear: "A law that is content based on its face is
subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government's benign
motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of 'animus toward
the ideas contained' in the regulated speech."lob
So, now, how have these principles fared since 2015 in
the Roberts Court? Extremely well, I submit, though there has
been a little slippage and much push back. First, in the two
Lanham Act trademark cases discussed above, Tam
101 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
102
See, e.g., Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299-2331 (2019) (striking down
ban on "immoral" or "scandalous" trademarks).
10 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
104 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015).
106 Id. at 165, 171.
106 Id. at 165 (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U. S. 410, 429
(1993)). For criticism of putting such a dispositive emphasis on whether the law is
facially content based, regardless of the law's purpose or justification, see William
Araiza, Invasion of the Content Neutrality Rule, 2019 BYU L. REV. 875 (2019); and
Genevieve Lakier, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona and the Rise of the Anti-Classificatory
FirstAmendment, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 223 (2016).
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(unanimous)107 and Brunetti (6-3),108 the Court found that the
rules against content-based censorship and viewpoint-based
discrimination were violated. In Tam, the Court unanimously
struck down a ban on "disparaging" trademarks, and the justices
found both that the law was content based without compelling
justification and indeed, even more vulnerably, viewpoint based,
relying on the enduring principle that speech cannot be
punished or restricted because it is offensive or disagreeable.109
The dangers of letting government suppress speech based on its
content or, worse, its viewpoint is anathema to the central
meaning of the First Amendment, as Justice Kennedy noted in
a concurring opinion in Tam:
A law that can be directed against speech found offensive to some
portion of the public can be turned against minority and dissenting
views to the detriment of all. The First Amendment does not entrust
that power to the government's benevolence. Instead, our reliance
must be on the substantial safeguards of free and open discussion in
a democratic society.110

Brunetti seemed like it might be a carbon copy with its
challenge to the statutory ban on "immoral or scandalous"
trademarks, applied to censor a clothing company that wanted
to be called "FUCT."111 But the unanimity of Tam gave way.
Justice Kagan's majority opinion was a powerful demonstration

of why the law was defectively and fatally viewpoint based,
permitting trademarks that expressed wholesome, proper, or
decent concepts but not the opposite.112 Nor could the statute be
interpreted more narrowly and perhaps more in line with the
Constitution to reach only "vulgar" trademarks.113
The statute was unanimously struck down with respect to
"immoral," but there was disagreement among the justices about
"scandalous."-Justice Alito, despite a powerful attack on viewpoint
censorship in our modern "cancel culture" world, suggested that if
Congress rewrote the statute to cover only the vulgar trademarks,
it might pass First Amendment scrutiny.114 And three partial
dissenters, including Chief Justice Roberts, would have interpreted
"scandalous" as limited to vulgar and, so limited, would have
107 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017). The unanimous decision in Tam
was 8-0, as Justice Gorsuch did not participate.
108 Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019).
109 See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751.
110 Id. at 1769.
111 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297-98 (2019).
112 Id. at 2299-300.
113 "Vulgai' here was defined as "lewd, sexually explicit or profane." Id. at 2301-02.
114 See id. at 2302-03 (Alito, J., concurring).
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upheld it. His opinion gave short shrift to protecting "vulgar"
speech in this noncriminal setting.115 That would seem to undercut
the classic First Amendment teachings of Cohen v. California,
where Justice Harlan's exquisitely careful opinion concluded that
"one man's vulgarity is another's lyric" and gave constitutional
protection against criminal punishment to wearing a jacket in
public that said "Fuck the Draft."116 Likewise, Justice Breyer
characteristically emphasized a balance to determine whether the
restriction on speech was "disproportionate" to the values of the
speech. He was concerned that otherwise, hurtful racial, ethnic,
and other epithets could be used to trademark products.117 Such a
communitarian approach to free speech is markedly different from
the libertarian views toward government control of content
expressed in Buckley and Virginia Pharmacy. Justice Sotomayor
likewise dissented because the government was now forced to
register trademarks containing the most vulgar, 'profane, or
obscene words and images imaginable.118
Other cases showed a similar fault line between the more
conservative, pro-free speech justices and the more liberal, proregulation members of the Court.119 But the end result was that the
majority prevailed in subjecting a variety of content-based speech
restricting laws to invalidation. So, in the pregnancy counseling
center cases discussed above, the majority ruled that the compelled
speech requirements imposed on the centers were content based,
failed strict or even intermediate scrutiny, and burdened the
centers' ability to speak their anti-abortion message.12 0 As Justice
Thomas put it for the Court: "The unlicensed notice imposes a
government-scripted, speaker-based disclosure requirement that is
wholly disconnected from California's informational interest" on a
narrow subset of facilities in a way that stifles their own message
by enforcing burdensome requirements on all advertising
materials.121 Justice Kennedy was more candid in his concurring

opinion, insisting that the California statute was designed as onesided government viewpoint discrimination against pro-life crisis

115

Id. at

116

See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 25 (1971) (Harlan, J., majority opinion).

2303-04 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

117
See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2304-08 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
118 Id. at 2308-18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
119
See, e.g., Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018)
(holding that a state mandate for pregnancy centers to provide certain notices to clients likely
violated First Amendment); Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31,
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (holding that public sector unions cannot collect union fees from
nonconsenting employees).
120 See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct at 2371, 2375.
121 Id. at 2377.
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pregnancy centers.1 22 Once again, the dissenters complained not
only that the particular findings against the laws were unjustified,
but that the rulings threatened a wide range of government
regulatory programs in the economic and social welfare areas by
"Lochnerizing" the First Amendment as a weapon against such
programs having little to do with appropriate free speech
protections.123 That seems a questionable accusation in an area
freighted with political issues, namely, pregnancy and abortion.
Finally, in two less controversial cases, the Court continued
to champion the principles against content-based, viewpointdiscriminating government censorship. In one case, restrictions on
the wearing of "political" badges, buttons, or other insignia in polling
places on election day were invalidated.124 Though the ban was
clearly content based, it operated within a so-called "non-public"
forum, an area controlled by government and dedicated to certain
functions and where speech rights can be limited somewhat to serve
the interests of the location.125 And the Court had long held that
express vote solicitation on or near the entrance to polling place
property could be restricted.126 But the Court nonetheless gave the
content-based ban a very close look and concluded that the state had
not defined "political"in a clear enough fashion, which then gave too
much discretion to the election monitors on the scene to pick and
choose which "political" buttons to ban and which to allow.127
The other case involved something we all can agree on: the
annoyance of robocalls.128 In 1991, Congress prohibited such
uninvited calls from being made to cell phones.129 But later,
Congress granted an exemption for calls made to collect a debt
owed to or guaranteed by the government.13 0 In effect, an exception
to the speech ban was given to a favored group, much like the
exemption given to labor disputes in the seminal Mosley case
above.131 A group of political advertisers, barred from using
robocalls to promote their political clients, challenged the
exemption on the ground that it constituted a content-based
favoritism which.was not extended to them.132 The Court concluded
Id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 2381-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
124 See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018).
125 Id. at 1885-86, 1888.
126 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
127 Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1888-92.
126 See Barr v. Am. Ass'n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020).
129 Id. at 2343 (noting that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
of 1991
(TCPA) generally prohibited such robocalls to cell and home phones).
130 Id. (stating that the exemption to the TCPA for federal governmentguaranteed debt collection robocalls was passed in 2015).
131
See supranotes 98-99 and accompanying text for discussion of Mosley.
132 Am. Ass'n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. at 2343.
122
123
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that the law was clearly a content-based law, and the government
conceded the exemption could not survive strict scrutiny.133
So, the political consultants won, no? No. Their First
Amendment victory was of the Pyrrhic variety, because the Court
went on to rule that the exemption for debt-collecting calls was
severable from the rest of the statute, which was then upheld
entirely.134 So, the debt-collectors lost, for sure, but the political
consultants only won the moral victory of having the exemption
decreed to be violative of the First Amendment. Some victory. And
Justice Breyer, concurring once again, complained that the robotic
application of strict scrutiny to all content-based laws, even those
dealing with routine economic and business regulations, threatens
to undo government policy without just cause and gives the First
Amendment a potent force in areas far removed from political
debate or discussion of matters of public concern. 135 In the view of
Justice Breyer, those former matters should be subject to the
broader government power to regulate business and economic
matters freed from the more rigorous restraints of First
Amendment doctrine.136 And once again, this criticism was echoed
and enforced by many academic commentators.1 37
But, finally, two other dissenters objected in the opposite
direction: they thought the statute was unconstitutional and
would have given the political consultants the fruits of their
litigative labor and granted an injunction against enforcement
of the law against them.13 The Court was faulted for ignoring a
key First Amendment instinct:
The First Amendment ... pushes, always, in one direction: against
governmental restrictions on speech. Yet, somehow, in the name of
vindicating the First Amendment, our remedial course today leads to
the unlikely result that not a single person will be allowed to speak
1 39
more freely and, instead, more speech will be banned.

Id. at 2346-47.
Id. at 2349, 2352-54.
135
Id. at 2358-62 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment with respect to severability
and dissenting in part).
136 Id.
For some articles reflecting and embodying these and similar criticism of
137
much of the Roberts Court's free speech work, see generally Toni M. Massaro & Helen
Norton, Free Speech and Democracy: A Primer for Twenty-First Century Reformers,
54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1631 (2021); and Louis Michael Seidman, Can Free Speech Be
Progressive?,118 COLUM. L. REV. 2219 (2018).
138 Am. Ass'n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. at 2363, 2365 (Gorsuch, J., joined
by Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
139 See id. at 2364-66. Justice Gorsuch's inclinations are reminiscent of the
famous opinion by Justice Brandeis with Justice Holmes indicating that the basic
principle of the First Amendment is to "eschew[] silence coerced by law" and seek "more
133
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Despite the unsatisfying bottom line in the robocall exception case,
the majority of the Roberts Court still consistently supports the
powerful, core First Amendment presumption against the validity of
content-based or viewpoint-based government regulations of speech.
D.

"The Vast DemocraticFora"of the Internet: How Free
Will It Remain?

Though the internet is ubiquitous, it has only infrequently
been the subject of Supreme Court First Amendment
consideration of how its eighteenth-century protections should
apply to the twenty-first century digital world. Is the internet a
threat to First Amendment values and rights of speech, press,
assembly, and petition or a facilitator of them? So far, the Court
has opted for the latter view.
In a landmark case in 1997, the Supreme Court
determined that the internet was a vital new public forum and
that normal First Amendment principles should apply and limit

government regulation and censorship of the "vast democratic
[fora] of the Internet," an opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens
that served as a powerful kind of Magna Carta for the internet.140
Twenty years later, in 2017, the Roberts Court reaffirmed, and
perhaps expanded this understanding and protection of the
critical function the internet performs to facilitate First
Amendment rights.141 Writing for the Court in Packingham v.

North Carolina, Justice Kennedy observed: "While in the past
there may have been difficulty in identifying the most important
places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the
answer is clear. It is cyberspace-the 'vast democratic forums of
the Internet' in general, and social media in particular."142 The
result was to invalidate a North Carolina law which made it a
felony for a registered sex offender to access social media sites
where minors had unrestricted access, like, for example,
Facebook and Twitter.143 Though noting the power of the state to
take more focused actions to protect crimes by sex offenders, the
Court said that this law was a "prohibition unprecedented in the
scope of First Amendment speech it burdens."144 Foreclosing
access to social media altogether and in such a sweeping manner
speech, not enforced silence." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76, 377 (1927),
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
140 See Reno v. Am. C.L. Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997).
141 See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
142 Id. at 1735 (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 868).
143 Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1733, 1738. Three justices concurred in the
judgment. Id. at 1733.
144
Id. at 1737.

overruled in part by Brandenburg
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is to prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate exercise of
First Amendment rights.
Despite the Court's enormous praise for the internet in its
2017 Packingham decision, there were storm clouds ahead. In the
past year, people at various ends of the political spectrum have
harshly criticized giant organizations like Google, Facebook, and
Twitter for wielding too much power of censorship and stifling
competition.1 45 Some have argued that they should be regulated
like gigantic public utilities because of the power they have.146 The
amassing of information about all of us seems a certain threat to
our privacy. Those who think that the internet is an
indispensable medium for the exercise of First Amendment
rights are rightly concerned, especially since the giant players
have come under fire from both the right and the left, and calls
for greater regulation of the internet have significantly
increased in Congress.147 Among the complaints are that the
internet giants should do or be required to do more to censor and
restrict hate speech, sexual speech, sex trafficking, terrorist

146
See, e.g., Peter Suciu, Do Social Media Companies Have the Right to Silence the
Masses-And Is this Censoring the Government?, FORBES (Jan. 11, 2021, 7:25 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2021/01/11/do-social-media-companies-have-the-right-to[https://perma
silence-the-masses--and-is-this-censoring-the-government/?sh=7d7fa08948e2
.cc/S97E-QUQS] (summarizing questions surrounding the right of social media to silence
Trump and political messaging).
146 See, e.g., Niall Ferguson, The 'Good Censors,' BLOOMBERG (Oct. 18, 2020, 8:00
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-10-18/facebook-twitter-google-cant-be-good-censors-of-politics (last visited Dec. 29, 2021) ("[W]e need to impose the
equivalent of First Amendment obligations on the network platforms, recognizing that they
are too dominant a part of the public sphere to be able to regulate access to it on the basis
of their own privately determined and almost certainly skewed 'community standards."');
Ahiza Garcia-Hodges, Big Tech has Big Power over Online Speech. Should It Be Reined In?,
NBC NEWS (Jan. 21, 2021, 12:00 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/big-techhas-big-power-over-online-speech-should-it-n1255164 [https://perma.cc/RGQ8-SQFB] ("All
of the legal experts .. .agreed that the major tech companies have incredible influence over
the content that'sput out into the world. But checking that power is likely to require overhauling
existing legislation or enacting new laws, neither of which will happen soon."); David L. Hudson,
Jr., In the Age of Social Media, Expand the Reach of the First Amendment, ABA,
https-/rb.gy/pvh9qf [https-/perma.cc/8UPD-JZBF] ("Certain powerful private entitiesparticularly social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and others-an limit, control,
and censor speech as much or more than governmental entities. A society that cares for the
protection of free expression needs to recognize that the time has come to extend the reach of
the First Amendment to cover these powerful, private entities .... ").
147 See, e.g., Lindsey Jacobson, Proposed Regulations over Internet Companies Could
Change
Free
Speech
Online,
CNBC
(June
27,
2020,
7:00
AM),
https:/www.cnbc.com/2020/06/27/doj-cal-for-internet-reform-may-change-free-speech-online.html
[httpsJ/perma.cc/SH84-56P5] (noting that four Senators called for the FCC to look into
Section 230, "which provides 'conduit immunity' to internet platforms"); Jessica Rich, After 20
Years of Debate, It's Time for Congress to Finally Pass a Baseline Privacy Law, BRoOKINGS
(Jan. 14, 2021), httpsJ/www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/01/14/after-20-years-of[https:/perma.cc/VU86debate-its-time-for-congress-to-finally-pass-a-baseline-privacy-law/
6UYD] (calling for Congress to pass privacy legislation).
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speech and the like, not to mention "disinformation."148 Others
would impose greater disclosure requirements on political
information and advertising on the internet, citing the Russian
efforts to use social media to influence our elections.149 Some
would eliminate the statutory immunity from suits for content
posted by third parties, as provided in Section 230 of
Communications Decency Act.150 That has recently been done in
a law, with the acronym FOSTA (Allow States and Victims to
Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017),151 which strips that
immunity where the posted information promotes sex
trafficking.152 That new restriction has been challenged by a

group of websites, two human rights organizations, an advocate
for sex workers rights, and a small business owner. 153

148
See, e.g., Roger McNamee, Big Tech Needs to Be Regulated. Here Are 4 Ways
to Curb Disinformation and Protect Our Privacy, TIME (July 29, 2020, 10:05 AM),
https://time.com/5872868/big-tech-regulated-here-is-4-ways/[https://perma.cc/6LPCAS34] (discussing the need for regulation across four areas: safety, privacy, competition,
and honesty); Jamie M. Freilich, Note, Section 230's Liability Shield in the Age of Online
Terrorist Recruitment, 83 BROOK L. REV. 675 (2017) (arguing that Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act should be amended to allow social media companies to be held
liable for terrorist speech on their platforms); Rob Portman, Opinion, How FederalLaw Protects
Online Sex Traffickers, WIRED (Oct. 24, 2017, 10:00 AM), https/www.wired.com/story/howfederal-law-protects-online-sex-traffickers/ [https://perma.cc/MIMK8-Z32K].
149 See, e.g., David Oxenford, FCC Issues "Clarifications"of Political Broadcasting
Public File Disclosure Requirements-Significantly More Disclosures to Be Required on Issue
Ads, BROAD. L. BLOG (Oct. 21, 2019), httpsJ/www.broadastlawblog.com/2019/10/articles/fccissues-clarifications-of-political-broadcasting-public-file-disclosure-requirements-significantlymore-disclosures-to-be-required-on-issue-ads/
[https:/perma.cc/926Q-VLCA]
(discussing
implications of two 2019 FCC decisions that addressed public complaints that several television
stations did not disclose sufficient information about political advertisements); see also
CambridgeAnalytica, GDPR - 1 Year On-A Lot Of Words And Some Action, PRIV. INT'L (Apr.
30 2019, 11:59 AM), https://privacyinternational.org/news-analysis/2857/cambridge-analyticagdpr-i-year-lot-words-and-some-action [https://perma.cc/AJM2-HM9T] (discussing Privacy
International's efforts to address data privacy concerns in the wake of news that personal
data from over 50 million Facebook users ended up in the hands of a private company
seeking to increase support Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign); Tim Lau, The
Honest Ads Act Explained, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 17, 2020),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/honest-ads-act-explained [https:/
perma.cc/UCH9-WDRJ] ("The proposed law would close a major loophole that allowed
Russia to pay for online political ads that attempted to influence the 2016 U.S. elections.").
150 See, e.g., Nina L Brown, Regulatory Goldilocks: Findingthe Just and Right Fit for
Content Moderation on Social Platforms, 8 TEX. A&M L. REV. 451 (2021) (discussing the
argument to amend or repeal Section 230 and its implications); Dan Patterson, What Is "Section
230,"and Why do Many Lawmakers Want to Repeal It?, CBS NEWS (Dec. 16, 2020, 10:59 AM),
httpsJ/www.cbsnews.com/news/what-is-section-230-and-why-do-so-many-lawmakers-want-torepeal-it/ [https://perma.cc/N932-VKZ3] (primer on Section 230 and the reasons for and risks
of repealing the law); see also Communications Decency Act of 1996, § 230, 47 U.S.C. 230
(amended 2018).
11
Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018) (codified at 18 U.S.C. 1591, 1595,
2421A and 47 U.S.C. § 230).
152 FOSTA, § 4 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 230); see also Woodhull Freedom Found.
v. United States, 948 F.3d 363, 368 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
153 See Woodhull, 948 F.3d at 369-70, 374 (holding that some plaintiffs had
standing to challenge the new law).
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Others claim that the major internet companies have
become a kind of corporate thought police, censoring and
squelching ideas that offend corporate consensus on any issue.154
That has become a sharply partisan issue with Republicans
claiming that giant internet platforms have censored speech
critical of Democrats, and the latter complaining that former
President Trump used social media to spread lies about the
election and incite insurrection.155
Another claim is that internet giants have become so
powerful that they should be broken up under the antitrust laws,
which the United States is alleging in a suit recently filed
against Facebook.156 But that suit was recently dismissed.167 An
earlier lawsuit filed by the United States and several states
against Google is still pending and scheduled for trial.158
Similarly, some claim that these entities are so powerful and
intertwined with government that their actions should be
subject to First Amendment scrutiny.169 Indeed, former
President Trump has recently filed a suit against Facebook,
154 See, e.g., Bill Buchanan, The Thought Police Have Finally Arrived?, MEDIUM
(Aug. 19, 2018), https://medium.com/asecuritysite-when-bob-met-alice/the-thoughtpolice-have-finally-arrived-9742765af6ea [https://perma.cc/LNL2-R8H2] (discussing how
targeted advertisements and data harvesting can influence political thought); Andrew Doyle,
When Will the Online Thought Police Come for You?, UNHERD (Jan. 6, 2021),
[https:/perma.cc/4CJRhttps://unherd.com/2021/01/how-big-tech-is-policing-the-pandemic/
XVA3] ("In recent years, there has been a growing misapprehension that censorship can only
be enacted by the state. But in reality, social media platforms are the de facto public square,
and the companies that run them are effectively the arbiters of a substantial proportion of
political discourse."); Chris Hedges, Thought Police for the 21st Century, OccUPY (Jan. 29,
2018), https://www.occupy.com/article/thought-police-21st-century#sthash.4WQc5Y7o.dpbs
[https://perma.cc/5QB3-5WJ2] (asserting that social media and online news "censorship,
justified in the name of combating terrorism by blocking the content of extremist groups, is
also designed to prevent a distressed public from accessing the language and ideas needed to
understand corporate oppression, imperialism and socialism").
See Colleen McClain & Monica Anderson, Republicans, Democrats at Odds over
155
Social Media Companies Banning Trump, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 27. 2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/01/27/republicans-democrats-at-odds-oversocial-media-companies-banning-trump/ [https://perma.cc/G6GN-9Q6D]; Lauren Aratani,
Trump Twitter: Republicans and Democrats Split Over Freedom of Speech, GUARDIAN (Jan.
9, 2021), https-/www.theguardiancom/us-news/2021/jan/09/trump-twitter-republicans-democrats
[https://perma.cc/94FL-AYDY].
156 See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Facebook, Inc., No. 20-3590 (JEB), 2021 WL
2643627, at *1 (D.D.C. June 28, 2021).
157 See id. at *23.
158
See Complaint, United States v. Google, L.L.C., No. 20-cv-03010-APM (D.D.C.
Oct. 20, 2020); Amended Scheduling and Case Management Order, No. 20-cv-03010-APM
(D.D.C. Feb. 3, 2021).
159 Victoria Baranetsky, Keeping the New Governors Accountable: Expanding
the First Amendment Right of Access to Silicon Valley, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST.
(Aug. 21, 2019), httpsJ/knightcolumbia.org/content/keeping-the-new-governors-accountable[https://perma.cc/6AW2-RP
expanding-the-first-amendment-right-of-access-to-silicon-valley
5U]; Craig Parshall, Big Tech and The Whole FirstAmendment, FEDERALIST Soc'Y (Aug.
14, 2020), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/fedsoc-blog/big-tech-and-the-whole-first-amendment
[https://perma.c/KHG8-ATUX].
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Google's YouTube, and Twitter, alleging that their censorship of
him and his supporters is both unconstitutional and illegal.160
But the very recent Roberts Court ruling in the cable access case
is likely to squelch that claim because of the "state action"
requirement.161 Whatever the ultimate merits of the Trump
litigation, it certainly strikes a responsive chord in the 32
percent portion of the public which still seems to support and
believe in former President Trump and feel that "the
Establishment" or "the deep state" were always out to get him.162
Finally, many worry about the capacity of social media to
wreak harm and havoc by swarming attacks on individuals and
incitement of "flash mobs."163 Indeed, the impact of so-called

"cancel culture" is often magnified by the power, intrusiveness,
160 See Michael C. Bender & Sarah E. Needleman, Trump Sues
Facebook, Twitter,
Google to Restore Social-Media Accounts, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-sues-facebook-twitter-google-to-restore-socialmedia-accounts-11625674561 [https://perma.cc/UG7Z-BADG] (noting that Big Tech's
justification for cutting off former President Trump's access to their platforms was that he
created a risk of continued violence by continuously stating that the 2020 election was a fraud,
especially following the January 6 riot at the Capitol and Trump's comments at the rally on
the day of the riot).
161 See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019)
(ruling that an operator of a public access cable channel is a private entity that cannot be
transformed into a state actor by merely opening its property for the speech of others,
resulting in the corporation not being subject to the First Amendment). Most observers
initially opined that the Supreme Court would follow this reasoning and hold that the Big
Tech defendants were not bound by the First Amendment, thus defeating Trump's claims,
see, for example, Aaron Blake, How Trump's Own Supreme Court Justice Undercut His
Facebook
Lawsuit,
WASH.
POST
(July
8,
2021,
11:25
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/07/08/how-trumps-own-supreme-courtjustice-undercut-his-facebook-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/4TRF-HC5S]. But, the complaint
alleges collusion between the leaders of the Big Tech companies and the Democratic
congressional leaders. Such an allegation, if proven, might show state action and subject
the companies to First Amendment limitations. See Vivek Ramaswamy, Opinion, Trump
Can Win His Case Against Tech Giants, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-can-win-his-case-against-tech-giants-11626025357
[https://perma.cc/K7VY-UDU3].
162 Regardless of the ultimate merits of the litigation former President Trump
has commenced against Facebook, Google's YouTube, and Twitter, there is still clear
outspoken support and endorsement of the former president. See, e.g., Chuck Todd et al.,
After 100 Days Out of Office, Trump's Support Softens in NBC News Poll, NBC NEWS
(Apr. 27, 2021, 9:21 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/after-100days-out-office-trump-s-support-softens-nbc-n1265457
[https://perma.cc/9B99-SBRY]
(noting that while support for the former president has somewhat declined, "the
perception of Trump's pull within his party couldn't be stronger"); Aaron Bycoffe et al.,
How Popular is Donald Trump?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/trump-approval-ratings/ [httpsJ/perma.cc/YU3F-PS4Q]
(depicting former President Trump's approval rating).
1e
Daniel Henninger, 'I Didn't Change. The World Changed,'WALL ST. J. (Aug. 30,
2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904199404576536882769562442
[https://perma.cc/C3DQ-D87Y] ("As we finish up, Mr. Cheney diverts into a consideration of
the sorts of responses governments may have to make when confronted by things in the news
now, such as 'flash mobs' using social media to organize riots through London. 'It's going to
present us with some pretty significant challenges that we've only begun to address.").
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and speed of social media. What will the Court say about all of
these varied issues and concerns, and will it change its very
positive and enabling view of the First Amendment importance
and protection of the internet? Grist for another symposium, I
am certain about that.
E.

Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate: At Last, GreaterFree
Speech Rights for Students

The two most recent cases where free speech prevailed,
handed down at the very end of the 2020 term, were both quite
pleasant surprises in that the Court supported and arguably
strengthened First Amendment rights in areas that in recent
years had been somewhat dormant.
In 1969, the Supreme Court handed down its landmark
Tinker decision, ruling that the First Amendment protected the
right of high school students to protest the Vietnam War by
wearing black armbands to school.164 As the Court ruled, only if
the students' behavior caused material and substantial
disruption of school processes or interference with the rights of
others could the students be silenced, and objection to their
political message would not be sufficient grounds to do so.1 65 This
heartening Magna Carta for free speech in schools was widely
heralded as opening an age of free speech on campus.1 66 The
problem was that, in the next five decades after the case was
decided, the Supreme Court handed down three significant cases
that deflected the Tinker principles and allowed school punishment
of various forms of student speech.167 The last of those three cases
was a disappointing 2007 Roberts Court decision which ruled that
the student display of a banner that seemed to advocate drug use
by declaring: "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" while attending an offcampus school-authorized field trip (to celebrate the Olympic torch
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504-05, 514 (1969)..
Id. at 506, 514 (famously asserting that "[i]t can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate").
166 See Education Law-Student Speech and the First Amendment, JRANK,
https://law.jrank.org/pages/6348/Education-Law-Student-Speech-First-Amendment.html
[https://perma.cc/5878-CTJX].
167 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (sexual
innuendo at school assembly); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276
(1988) (student newspapers that are part of the school curriculum); Morse v. Frederick,
551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (speech promoting illegal drug use). During that long period,
college students fared much better in vindicating their free speech rights on campus. See
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 194 (1972) (recognition of student organization); Papish v.
Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 671 (1973) ("indecent speech" in student
newspaper); Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845 (1995)
(withholding of university funds from student religious publication).
164
166
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being carried through town), justified punishment of the high
school student involved.168
So, supporters of free speech rights for high school students
were a bit concerned when the Court granted review in 2021 of the
Mahanoy case, a school board's appeal seeking the right to penalize
a high school student for vulgar but off-campus social media
speech.169 Having not gotten a coveted spot on the cheerleading
team, the student expressed her disappointment by sending out an
angry Snapchat message to friends with a photo in which she had
her middle finger raised, with the caption: "Fuck school fuck
softball fuck cheer fuck everything."170 The case raised the very
broad issues of student free speech and the internet under the
Tinker regime. To what extent may schools penalize students on
the basis of things said and done on social media or the internet
outside the physical confines of the school, or perhaps even on
school premises but on the internet?
The lower court had taken a very broad and speechprotective position that, categorically under Tinker, students could
not be punished by the school for otherwise legal speech that takes
place off-campus, even if it had an impact on the school in some
fashion.171 The Supreme Court ruled for the student, but took a
somewhat less capacious and more narrow approach, which is not
surprising since the opinion was written by Justice Breyer who

generally eschews categorical approaches in favor of multifactor
balancing.172 Accordingly, the opinion observed, in considered
dictum, that schools might be able to punish off-campus or internet
speech in some circumstances:
Unlike the Third Circuit, we do not believe the special characteristics
that give schools additional license to regulate student speech always
disappear when a school regulates speech that takes place off campus.
The school's regulatory interests remain significant in some off-campus
circumstances... . These include serious or severe bullying or
harassment targeting particular individuals; threats aimed at teachers
or other students; the failure to follow rules concerning lessons, the
writing of papers, the use of computers, or participation in other online

168

See Frederick, 551 U.S. at 397, 410.

See Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. Levy ex rel. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2042-43 (2021).
Id. at 2043.
171
Levy ex rel. B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 170, 189 (3d Cir. 2020).
172 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring)
("I would ask whether the statutes strike a reasonable balance between their speechrestricting and speech-enhancing consequences. Or do they instead impose restrictions on
speech that are disproportionate when measured against their corresponding privacy and
speech-related benefits, taking into account the kind, the importance, and the extent of
these benefits, as well as the need for the restrictions in order to secure those benefits?
What this Court has called 'strict scrutiny' ... is normally out of place where, as here,
important competing constitutional interests are implicated.").
169

170
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school activities; and breaches of school security devices, including
173
material maintained within school computers.

Instead of applying a categorical rule, Breyer noted that
three considerations should make courts wary of allowing
schools to supervise what students say off campus: (1) parents
rather than administrators are better suited to disciplining
children away from school, (2) the specter of round-the-clock
surveillance is at odds with free speech values, and (3) schools
should teach students that unpopular speech is worthy of
protection.174 The conclusion: because none of the factors in the
case directly involved individuals at the school, were she an
adult there would be no penalty for what she sent out, it was
done off school grounds and on a weekend, and.it did not seem
to cause any substantial disruption at school, the First
Breyer
Justice
Importantly,
prevailed.175
Amendment
emphasized that what schools must teach students is the value
of free speech:
America's public schools are the nurseries of democracy. Our
representative democracy only works if we protect the "marketplace
of ideas." . . . Thus, schools have a strong interest in ensuring that
future generations understand the workings in practice of the wellknown aphorism, "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to
the death your right to say it."176

Though the ACLU, which represented the student in the
Mahanoy case, said that this was a huge victory for the free speech
rights of students in America,177 my concern is that the ruling is
specifically contingent on the facts being so divorced from any
school concerns that there are no clear guidelines as to how future,
more borderline cases will be resolved, and the chilling effect of
such uncertainty is disturbing. For example, if the student's online
profanity had been directed at the school principal by name or the
volleyball coach, would it still have been protected? Indeed, Justice
Breyer's majority opinion itself stated:
Given the many different kinds of off-campus speech, the different
potential school-related and circumstance-specific justifications, and the

Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2045.
Id. at 2046.
175
Id. at 2046-48.
176
Id. at 2046. Justice Thomas was the sole dissenter, taking his usual view
that in light of history and tradition, children are properly supervised by their parents
and their school officials and do not have an extensive array of First Amendment rights
to invoke. Id. at 2059-63.
177
Supreme Court Decision Rules to Protect Students'Full Free Speech Rights, ACLU
PA. (June 23, 2021), https://www.aclupa.org/en/press-releases/supreme-court-decisionrules-protect-students-full-free-speech-rights [https://perma.cc/8AN5-M6UV].
173
174
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differing extent to which those justifications may call for First Amendment
leeway, we can, as a general matter, say little more than this: Taken
together, these three features of much off-campus speech mean that the
leeway the First Amendment grants to schools in light of their special
characteristics is diminished. We leave for future cases to decide where,
when, and how these features mean the speaker's off-campus location will
make the criticaldifference. This case can, however, provide one example. 178

A categorical approach against punishment for all or almost all
social media speech by students would have been more secure
protection. But one of the noted hallmarks of Chief Justice
Roberts's regime is often incrementalism and minimalism and
trying to get as much common ground among the justices as

possible. An 8-1 victory for the student on less than broader
grounds is a classic example of that strategy. But the case remains
an important victory for free speech and joins the Roberts Court's
pro-speech canon.

F.

NAACP Rules: A Strong Revival for the Right of
AssociationalPrivacy

Fortunately, the other free speech case of the October
2020 term, which was a pleasant surprise, had more free speech
wind in the sails of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts.
In a landmark 1958 decision, the Supreme Court observed the
precious rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are
importantly interrelated:
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view,
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group
association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking
upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.

It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation
with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on
freedom of association as the forms of governmental action in the cases
above were thought likely to produce upon the particular constitutional
rights there involved. This Court has recognized the vital relationship
between
freedom
to
associate
and
privacy
in
one's
associations.... Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many
circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association,
particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs. 179

Thus was born the right of associational privacy recognized
as essential to the implementation of political rights under the
178 Id. at 2046 (emphasis added).
179 See Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 460, 462 (1958).
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First Amendment. This protected right of association furthers a
wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious,
and cultural ends, and is especially important in preserving
political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident
expression from suppression by the majority. Accordingly, the
government must have strong reasons, such as evidence of
corporate wrongdoing or organizational irregularities, to try to

justify such compelled, destructive disclosure against civil rights
groups like the NAACP.
Two decades later, the Court applied similar principles in
the context of campaign finance laws requiring disclosure of
contributors to candidates and political organizations and
reaffirmed that such disclosure would be judged by "exacting
scrutiny" requiring a substantial relation between the disclosure
requirement and a sufficiently important governmental interest.180

In 2021, the Court in the AFP case applied that same
standard to determine whether charitable organizations, in order
to solicit funds in California for their countless causes, had to
provide the attorney general a list of their donors of more than
$5,000.181 About ten years ago, Democratic attorneys general in

both New York and California began actively imposing such
disclosure requirements on charities seeking to raise funds in their
states, even though previously enforcement had been lax.182
Though the lists of donors were supposedly strictly confidential and
not for public disclosure, there had been many breaches of this
confidentiality over the years in California. The Court also
determined that the disclosure regime burdened the associational
rights of donors, that the Americans for Prosperity Foundation, a
conservative organization, had suffered from threats and
harassment in the past, and that donors were likely to face similar
retaliation in the future if their affiliations and financial support
became publicly known.183
The parties disputed whether the exacting scrutiny test
required a least restrictive means inquiry similar to the one imposed
by strict scrutiny. The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts,
concluded that exacting scrutiny requires that a governmentmandated disclosure regime be narrowly tailored to the
government's asserted interest, even if it is not the least restrictive

180

181

See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60-64 (1976) (per curiam).
See Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2379, 2380-81,

2388 (2021).
See id. at 2380; Citizens United v. Schneiderman, 882 F.3d 374, 379
182
(2d Cir. 2018).
183
See Ams. for Prosperity, 141 S. Ct. at 2381, 2389.
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means of achieving that end.184 Applying this standard, the Court
concluded that the narrow tailoring requirement was not satisfied
by California's disclosure regime. The Court noted that "[t]here is a
dramatic mismatch, however, between the interest the Attorney
General seeks to promote and the disclosure regime that he has
implemented in the service of that end."185 There was almost no real
need for the wholesale disclosure, and the potential of real harm to
donors and the organizations they support across the political
spectrum was palpable. Hence the gross mismatch. The Court's
conclusion: the attorney general's disclosure requirement "imposes
a widespread burden on donors' associational rights[,] [a]nd this
burden cannot be justified on the ground that the regime is narrowly

tailored to investigating charitable wrongdoing, or that the State's
interest in administrative convenience is sufficiently important."18
In reaching that result, Chief Justice Roberts went out of
his way to point out dramatically that strong protection for First
Amendment rights benefits people and groups across the
political spectrum:
The gravity of the privacy concerns in this context is further
underscored by the filings of hundreds of organizations as amici curiae in
support of the petitioners. Far from representing uniquely sensitive
causes, these organizations span the ideological spectrum, and indeed the
full range of human endeavors: from the American Civil Liberties Union
to the Proposition 8 Legal Defense Fund; from the Council on AmericanIslamic Relations to the Zionist Organization of America; from Feeding
America-Eastern Wisconsin to PBS Reno. The deterrent effect feared by
these organizations is real and pervasive, even if their concerns are not
shared by every single charity operating or raising funds in Calif6rnia. 187

Conversely, Justice Sotomayor for three dissenters
maintained that "[t]oday's decision discards decades of First
Amendment jurisprudence recognizing that reporting and disclosure
requirements do not directly burden associational rights."188

This is a very important case for several reasons. First,
at a jurisprudential level, the quote in the paragraph above is a
paradigmatic demonstration of the importance of protecting the
First Amendment rights of groups and speech across the
political spectrum and who are often at odds with each other and
shows a continued strong embrace on behalf of the Roberts Court
of the theme of allowing as much speech as possible across the
ideological spectrum. It evokes connections to the most speech-

187

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

188

Id. at 2404 (Sotomayor, J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ., dissenting).

184
185
188

at
at
at
at

2384-85.
2386.
2389.
2388.
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protective justices of the twentieth century: Holmes and
Brandeis and Black and Douglas, and, of course, Kennedy.189
Second, this is the first time in more than twenty years, since
1999, that the Court has invalidated a disclosure requirement
on First Amendment grounds.190 Since then, the Court has
upheld disclosure requirements in campaign finance and related
settings in an almost perfunctory way.191 And, indeed, in Citizens
United, Justice Kennedy relied on the benefits of disclosure as a
justification for invalidating limits on political spending by
corporations, unions, and nonprofits: "The First Amendment
protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and
shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a
proper way."192 Third, the Court has clarified the exacting
scrutiny standard and applied it in a quite rigorous and
muscular way to invalidate the charity disclosure requirement
on its face. Fourth, the net effect is another case where
compelled speech, i.e., disclosure, is rebuffed by the Court.
Finally, despite the different settings, the strong review
of disclosure requirements in the Court's AFP opinion may very
well have some spillover effect on campaign finance law. The
"exacting scrutiny" standard and its narrow tailoring
requirement may become the measure in the campaign finance
disclosure area and other aspects of campaign finance law like,
for example, the validity of various kinds of contribution limits.
As a leading election law advocate, who favors strong limits on
spending and significant disclosure of giving, put it:
The [C]ourt's ruling calls into question a number of campaign finance
disclosure laws. Perhaps even more significant, it also threatens the
constitutionality of campaign contribution laws, which are judged under
the "exacting scrutiny" standard, too. Lower courts can now find that such
laws are not narrowly tailored to prevent corruption or its appearance or

See Gora, supra note 2, at 71, 76.
See Buckley v. Am. Const. L. Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 201-04 (1999)
(invalidating state disclosure requirement for names and addresses of petition
circulators and their total pay); see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S.
334, 347, 357 (1995) (invalidating state prohibition on distribution of anonymous ballot
question campaign literature); Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio),
459 U.S. 87, 101-02 (1982) (invalidating state requirement that minor political party
disclose membership, contributors, or associates).
191 See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 194-202 (2003)
("electioneering communications"), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365-66 (corporate
independent expenditures); Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 201-02 (2010) (referendum signatures).
192 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371.
189
190
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do not provide voters with valuable information-two interests the
[C]ourt recognized in the past to justify campaign laws. 193

As one who has long argued that restrictive and burdensome
campaign finance laws are harmful, not helpful, to democracy, I
hope he is right.
G.

Freedom of Religion: Still Robustly Protected

In my 2016 First Amendment survey of the first decade
of the Roberts Court, I noted that one of the prevalent themes
was to increase the area of individual choice about speech and
decrease the area of government regulation of those choices.194
Under that rubric, I noted the effect of some of the Court's
important freedom of religion cases during that period: "[I]n both
honoring Free Exercise Clause claims that government should
accommodate religious conscience, and rejecting Establishment
Clause objections that the government should not be supporting
religious activity, the Court expanded the range of personal
choice over religious expression and reduced the area of
[permissible] government mandate."195 But I also noted that,
where there was a tension between religious freedom and gay
rights, especially the right to same-sex marriage, the First
Amendment was not guaranteed to prevail.196
The most recent five-year period of the Roberts Court has
witnessed a similar pattern. First, freedom of religion claims have
prevailed in all six major cases during that period, in both free
exercise rulings requiring government to support or accommodate

religious freedom and activity and establishment clause cases
holding that government could include or recognize religious
speech or activities without running afoul of that provision.
In 2012, the Roberts Court had ruled unanimously that
the free exercise clause required the judicial creation of a
"ministerial exception" immunizing from scrutiny a church's
decision to fire a religious instruction teacher even against her
claim that the firing violated the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (ADA).197 Such government intrusion into the selection or
retention of a minister contravened both the free exercise clause
193
Richard L. Hasen, Opinion, The Supreme Court is Putting Democracy at
Risk, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/01/opinion/supremecourt-rulings-arizona-california.html [https://perma.cc/XD2B-DVX4].
194
See Gora, supra note 2, at 100.
195 Id. at 105.
196 Id. at 106-08.
197 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp.
Opportunity Comm'n, 565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012).
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and the establishment clause, both protecting religious freedom
from government mandate.198 In 2020, the Court reaffirmed those
powerful principles and the corresponding right of religious
communities to select their own teachers and teachings, applying
the ministerial exception to defeat suits under both the ADA and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.199 Thus,
religious freedom afforded by the "ministerial exception" trumps
claims of employment discrimination.
A similar pattern is found in other recent Roberts Court
cases. In 2002, the Rehnquist Court, 5-4, had held that
government could provide financial assistance for supplies or
tuition to parents of children attending public or private schools
and in the latter case secular or religious ones, without violating
the establishment clause.200 In 2017, the Roberts Court applied
these same principles to strike down a state law which provided
school funding for improving playground surfaces, but excluded
religious school playgrounds from eligibility for the benefit.201
The Court, 7-2, found this a wholly unjustified violation of the
free exercise clause to punish and deny an educational benefit
because the school was religious.202 Likewise, in 2020, the Court
ruled that denial of a tax credit for contributions to schools, if
made to religious schools, was likewise a wholly impermissible
discrimination against religion in clear contravention of the free
exercise clause.203
Finally, in 2019, the Roberts Court, 7-2, rejected an

establishment clause challenge to a very large and long-standing
World War I memorial cross located on public property and
maintained by government.2 0 4 In a very impassioned prevailing
opinion, Justice Alito, even quoting the famous poem
"In Flanders Fields,"
In Flanders fields the poppies blow
Between the crosses, row on row,

ruled the cross in the context of a war memorial to be
constitutional.205 Rather than ask what a hypothetical "reasonable
observer" would think about the display and whether the
government was endorsing religion, the Court looked instead to the
198
199
200
201

See id. at 188-89.
See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2069 (2020).
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002).
See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012,

2024-25 (2017).
202

203
204
206

See id. at 2024.
See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, 140

See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 139
Id. at 2075, 2090.

S.

Ct. 2246, 2262-63 (2020).

S. Ct. 2067, 2072, 2089-90 (2019).

FREE SPEECHSTILL MATTERS

2021]

231

perspective of respecting history and tradition in trying to

determine whether such a display violates the establishment
clause.20 And the Court majority indicated that such noncoercive
and long-standing displays and practices should not be uprooted on
the complaint of offended observers seeking to cancel those
displays.207 Justice Ginsburg was no less passionate in her dissent,
pointedly observing that the Latin cross is foremost a symbol of
Christianity not placed over the graves of people of other religions,
and government's display of it in the fashion here elevates that
religion, Christianity, over all others.208
In light of this powerful protection of religious freedom and
autonomy, as safeguarded by both the free exercise and
establishment clauses, against various forms of significant
countervailing government interests, it is noteworthy that the

Court has had such difficulties when the cases have involved gay
rights versus religious autonomy. Two recent Roberts Court cases
have witnessed the Court struggling with how to strike the delicate
balance of reconciling two competing yet powerful and worthwhile
sets of values. The Court resolved both of those cases in favor of the
religious claimant, but on seemingly narrow grounds, specific to
the particular cases, which seemed to many not to resolve the
broader issues going forward. But other knowledgeable observers
suggest that the Court was effectively putting its thumb on the
scale in favor of religion, in these contexts. 209

The first case is quite well known-the cake baker case.
A same-sex couple went into a bakery owned and operated by a
religious cake baker in Colorado and asked him to bake a cake
to celebrate their wedding.210 He explained to them that, because
of his religious beliefs, he was opposed to same-sex marriage and
he could not create that same-sex couple wedding cake, but he
claimed he would have provided any other cake product for any
other occasion.211 The couple subsequently filed a complaint with
Id. at 2089-90.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 2104 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
209 See Thomas Berg & Douglas Laycock, Symposium: Masterpiece Cakeshop-Not
as Narrow as May First Appear, SCOTUSBLOG (June 5, 2018, 3:48 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-masterpiece-cakeshop-not-as-narrowas-may-first-appear [https://perma.cc/8FYT-AJQ2]; Thomas Berg & Douglas Laycock,
Protecting Free Exercise Under Smith and After Smith, SCOTUSBLOG (June 19, 2021, 6:37
PM),
https:/www.scotusblog.com/2021/06/protecting-free-exercise-under-smith-and-aftersmith/ [https://perma.cc/UUD8-XT6T]; Andrea Picciotti-Bayer, From the Court, a Vindication
of Faith-basedSeruice. From Alito, a Blueprint for the Future, SCOTUSBLOG (June 19, 2021,
4:37 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/06/from-the-court-a-vindication-of-faith-basedservice-from-alito-a-blueprint-for-the-future/ [https://perma.cc/N93W-6VNG].
210
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm'n, 138 S. Ct.1719, 1724(2018).
211 Id. at 1723-24.
206
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the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, complaining that the
refusal of service was because of their sexual orientation and
constituted improper discrimination by a public accommodation
in violation of Colorado's pertinent antidiscrimination statute. 212
The baker claimed that his religious beliefs gave him no choice
and that, in effect, the free exercise clause required recognition
and accommodation of a constitutional exemption from that law
in his case. 213 The Colorado courts ruled against the baker and
in favor of the gay couple, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear
his appeal.214 Also pertinent is that by that point, the Roberts
Court had ruled that the Constitution protects and guarantees
the

right

of

same-sex

marriage

against

government

discrimination and denia.215
The Court seemed on the verge of trying to resolve a
classic dispute between clashing sets of individual rights, and
dozens of briefs were filed on either side of the issues. The end
result was not a clear win for either side. Instead, a 7-2 Court
ruled for the baker on the case-specific ground that the Civil
Rights Commission's decision against him was tainted by
expression of hostility and animus against his religious beliefs
by one of the commissioners.216 That violated the free exercise
clause's requirement of religious neutrality and vitiated the
administrative ruling against the baker. The Court's opinion,
written by Justice Kennedy, both the Court's strongest First
Amendment champion27 and also the author of the landmark
same-sex marriage opinion,218 acknowledged the importance of
the constitutional right to same-sex marriage and the
importance of First Amendment rights of free speech and
religious freedom.219 But the Court refrained from resolving the
212
213
214

Id. at 1725.
Id. at 1726.
Id. at 1727.

215

See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675-76 (2015).
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1722, 1729-32. The baker raised
both free exercise and free speech claims, but the Court only ruled on the free exercise
issues. Id. at 1723-24. The Court quoted the following anti-religious sentiments
expressed by one commissioner:
216

Freedom of religion and religion ha[ve] been used to justify all kinds of discrimination
throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it beI mean, we-we can list hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has been
used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most despicable pieces of
rhetoric that people can use to-to use their religion to hurt others.
Id. at 1729. Those remarks were viewed as having tainted the commission's decision on
the baker's religious freedom claims. Id.
217 See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
218 Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
219 Id. at 1727.
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broader issues of the clash between the two. There were
concurring opinions coming down on either side of the debate,
and a two-justice dissent by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor,
maintaining that it was a clear case of sexual orientation
discrimination, not excused by the free exercise clause and
justifying
penalties
against
the
baker
under
the
antidiscrimination law.220

In 2021, we witnessed a redux of the cake baker case, this
time involving Catholic Social Services in Philadelphia. And this
time, the Court was unanimous but, once again, seemed to fail
to resolve the broader clash of values and rights, though some
observers suggest the ruling was not that limited and would give
strong protection to religious freedom going forward.221
For decades, the Catholic foster care agency had been
hired by the City of Philadelphia to review applications by
couples to take in foster children under the city's care. Because
of its religious beliefs, the Catholic agency would not certify
same-sex couples as foster parents.222 When this came to light in
a newspaper article, city officials began reviewing their
relationship with the agency and ultimately refused to renew the
contract because the agency's policy against same-sex couples

sexual orientation
violated the city's rules against
discrimination, although no same-sex couple had ever sought
certification from the agency.223 The Catholic agency sued and
lower courts upheld the penalty, reasoning that the city's
requirement of no discrimination was a neutral rule of general
application which supported the valid antidiscrimination
220
Id. at 1722; id. at 1748-52 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Sotomayor, J., dissenting). For
arguments on either side of the controversy, see Sherrilyn Ifill, Symposium: The First
Amendment ProtectsSpeech and Religion, Not Discriminationin Public Spaces, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 5,2018, 1:13 PM), httpsJ/www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-the-first-amendmentprotects-speech-and-religion-not-discrimination-in-public-spaces/ [https:/perma.cc/Z4QB-8D84];
and Richard Epstein, Symposium: The Worst Form of JudicialMinimalism-Masterpiece
Cakeshop Deserved a Full Vindication for its Claims of Religious Liberty and Free Speech,
SCOTUSBLoG (June 4, 2018, 8:29 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposiumthe-worst-form-of-judicial-minimalism-masterpiece-cakeshop-deserved-a-full-vindicationfor-its-claims-of-religious-liberty-and-free-speech/ [https://perma.cc/Q58E-RH53].
221
See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021). For suggestions
that the Court was more favorable to the religious claim than the antidiscrimination
claim, see Berg & Laycock, supranote 209; and Picciotti-Bayer, supra note 209. See also
Walter Olson, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia: Yes, It Was a Big Deal, CATO INST.
(June 22, 2021, 1:32 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/fulton-v-city-philadelphia-yes-itwas-big-deal [https://perma.cc/3WRW-5H3A] (noting the Fulton decision indicated that
a majority of the Court is willing to overrule the Smith standard and the Court finding
that foster services were not a public accommodation appeared to narrow the reach of
the "public accommodation" definition; quoting an observation on Twitter that Fulton
showed that "the modern Court clearly perceives a First Amendment right to
discriminate to be non-frivolous in nature").
222
See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1874.
223 See id. at 1875.
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policies.224 The agency appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming
the city's requirement violated both the free speech and free
exercise clauses, but the Court unanimously ruled in the
agency's favor on free exercise grounds.225
Here was the reasoning in an opinion by Chief Justice
Roberts. First, since the Philadelphia local law permitted
officials to grant exemptions from the antidiscrimination
requirement, that law could not seek the safe harbor afforded to
a law of general and neutral application challenged under the
free exercise clause. Under established precedent, a law which
is completely neutral, but incidentally burdens religion, must
pass only deferential judicial review, not strict scrutiny.226 When
it is not so neutral, then the refusal to grant a religious
accommodation requires strict scrutiny to find a compelling
justification for that refusal.227 And that invokes another rule
that restricting religious conduct "while permitting secular
conduct that undermines the government's asserted interest in
a similar way" is evidence of lack of general and neutral
application.228 Put the two together, and the refusal to renew the
contract violates the free exercise clause.
If that all seems a bit convoluted, it is. And its
consequence is subject to interpretation. To the conservative
Justice Alito, the Court's decision
might as well be written on the dissolving paper sold in magic shops ... [hf
the City wants to get around today's decision, it can simply eliminate the
never-used exemption power. If it does that, then, voila, today's decision will
vanish-and the parties will be back where they started. 229

His opinion concluded:
After receiving more than 2,500 pages of briefing and after more
than a half-year of post-argument cogitation, the Court has emitted a
wisp of a decision that leaves religious liberty in a confused and
vulnerable state. Those who count on this Court to stand up for the
First Amendment have every right to be disappointed-as am I.230

Likewise, the Wall Street Journal editorially described the
decision as "[a] narrow ruling [that] helps Catholic foster
See id. at 1876.
225 See id. at 1871.
226 See Emp. Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-82 (1990).
227
See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1876-77.
228
See id. at 1877. This rule is articulated in the case of Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533-34 (1993).
229
Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1887 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (footnote omitted).
230
Id. at 1926. As a reflection of his intensity on these religious freedom issues,
Justice Alito's concurring opinion was five times longer than Chief Justice Roberts's
opinion for the Court!
224

2021]

FREE SPEECH STILL MATTERS

235

parents, but the faithful deserve more protection under the First

Amendment.... Unlike the liberals of 30 or even 10 years ago,
today's secular progressives are openly hostile to religious
liberty, which needs a Supreme Court willing to defend it."231
On the contrary, the New York Times's long-time Supreme
Court reporter, Adam Liptak, called the decision "a setback for gay
rights and further evidence that religious groups almost always
prevail in the current [C]ourt."232 Veteran Supreme Court observer
Linda Greenhouse amplified that analysis. She saw the decision as
one of the many Roberts Court's pro-religion rulings and felt that
it opened the door to religious challenges to neutral government
laws whenever some exception was potentially available or some
momentary hostility to religion was expressed.233 Rashomon!
Finally, to those who feel that the decision was more
equivocal than either Justice Alito or Ms. Greenhouse and Mr.
Liptak suggest, the conventional wisdom is that the Court in both
the cake baker case and the Catholic charity case was kicking the
can down the road to avoid a wrenching and divisive opinion. And
that such an approach is congenial to Chief Justice Roberts who
often opts for temporizing, narrow resolutions in politically sensitive

and difficult cases, in part, the speculation goes, to help preserve the
institutional integrity of the Court and its reality or appearance of
being genuinely nonpolitical or partisan. But as the conservative

concurring justices pointed out, the Catholic charity won the battle,
but still has an ongoing war to face with a city that will continue to
resist using the agency's services because of the church's stand on
marriage equality, and the cake baker is also subject to continuing
pressures to choose between his religion and his livelihood.234 In this
view, a clear decision in favor of strong protection for religious
accommodation claims would be a better solution.
But despite Chief Justice Roberts's supposed temptation to
temporize, overall, he has presided over arguably the longest and
strongest period of protecting First Amendment values in Supreme

Court history.
Amendment."23

He

has

earned

the

nickname,

"Mr.

First

231 See The Editorial Board, Opinion, One Cheer for the Supreme Court on Religious
Liberty, WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2021, 6:50 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/one-cheer-for-thesupreme-court-on-religious-liberty-11623970233 [https://perma.cc/J2EV-PUL6].
282 See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Backs Catholic Agency in Case on Gay Rights
and Foster Care, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2021), http-/www.nytimes.com/2021/06/17/us/supremecourt-gay-rights-foster-care.html [https://perma.cc/XTY3-CQC2].
233 See Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, What the Supreme Court Did for Religion,
N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/01/opinion/supreme-courtreligion.html [https://perma.cc/N2HY-8Q8L].
234 See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1926-32 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment).
235 See Collins & Hudson, supra note 56.
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III.

IN THE Loss COLUMN: FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS
DEFLECTED OR REJECTED

As I have noted, the Roberts Court free speech record in
the last five years continues to reflect a strong commitment to
rigorous protection of those rights. An .800 batting average with

the First Amendment claim prevailing 80 percent of the time is
quite impressive, indeed. But of the approximately twenty cases
surveyed here, there were four that in one way or another
rejected or deflected the First Amendment claim. What were
they, was there any common ground, and do they significantly
undermine the Court's positive pro-free speech record?
A.

Retaliatory Arrests

There is a small corner of remedial First Amendment law
which involves suits against the police or similar government
agencies contending that arrests or prosecutions are motivated
by a desire to retaliate against the target because of their
protected political speech, for example criticism of the police
department or the local government. The problem is if the arrest
or prosecution is otherwise valid and based on probable cause,
can the speech retaliation claim go forward? Was T. S. Eliot right
when he said: "The last temptation is the greatest treason: To do
the right deed for the wrong reason"?236 The Court's answer in
two cases was: although it depends on what the "but-for" cause
of the arrest was, the normal rule is that the existence of
probable cause for the arrest will defeat the retaliation claim.237
If the arrest was because of the apparent commission of the
crime, there is no remedy. But if there was a policy of retaliatory
arrests of government critics or clear proof of animus against a
particular defendant, the First Amendment claim may go
forward. Accordingly, in a 2018 case, the Court found the
retaliation claim could proceed, despite the presence of probable
cause, because of an alleged official policy of intimidation
against the plaintiff.238 But a year later, a similar claim was
defeated by probable cause for the arrest and no other factor
possibly indicating retaliation.239 So, one loss for a First
Amendment claimant.
236 See T.S. ELIOT, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL 44 (1935).
237 Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1722 (2019); Lozman v. City of Riviera
Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1953-54 (2018).
238 See Lozman, 138.S. Ct. at 1954-55.
239 See Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1727-28. In Lozman, the Court allowed the
retaliatory arrest claim to proceed because Lozman alleged "more governmental action
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Political Gerrymanderingof Electoral Districts

The process of "gerrymandering" is as old as the Republic.240
It is the method whereby legislative districts are drawn and
arranged in such a way as to make it more likely that the party in
power will more easily elect more of its members to office.241 For
example, in a hypothetical state where Republicans (or Democrats)
have only 45 percent of the registered voters, the goal is to figure
out an electoral districting plan which allows them to win 55
percent of the legislative districts.242 The result can often be
districts with weird shapes, including those that look like a lizard
or salamander. The term "gerrymander" was coined because
Boston political leader Elbridge Gerry, who helped write the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, was so good at it.243
For two centuries, the Supreme Court stayed out of the
situation. But in modern times, suits have been filed claiming that
such practices were unconstitutional on two grounds. One claimed
an equal protection violation in that such schemes allegedly
deprived voters of an equal opportunity to influence political
outcomes. 24 4 The second claim is that such practices punish voters
and diminish their political power because of their political views
and affiliations, in violation of the First Amendment.245 For
decades, a majority of the Supreme Court refused to resolve such
arguments on the ground that there were no "judicially
manageable standards" to determine whether the electoral
outcomes were the result of gerrymandering or of better candidates
[occurred] than simply an arrest." Lozman, 138 S. Ct. at 1954. Lozman claimed the City
of Riviera Beach itself acted pursuant to an official policy of intimidation in which the
city officials were retaliating based on Lozman's prior criticisms of those city officials and
prior lawsuits against the city. Id. Indeed, Lozman was arrested while speaking at a city
council meeting open for public comment. Id. at 1949-50.
240 The concept of "gerrymandering" was depicted in a political cartoon in the Boston
Gazette in March 1812, with the practice also being traced back to eighteenth century England
and carried over as the United States was founded. Becky Little, How GerrymanderingBegan
in the US, HISTORY (Apr. 20, 2021), https-/www.history.com/news/gerrymandering-originsvoting [https://perma.cc/83NF-L8R6].
241
See id.
242 See Erick Trickey, Where Did the Term "Gerrymander" Come From?,
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (July 20, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/wheredid-term-gerrymander-come-180964118/ [https://perma.cc/C5V6-JTEG]. For a number
of real-world examples of how this works, see Alex Tausanovitch and Danielle Root, How
PartisanGerrymanderingLimits Voting Rights, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, (July 8, 2020,
9:03 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2020/07/08/4874
26/partisan-gerrymandering-limits-voting-rights [https://perma.ccN5TY-L2GQ].
243 See Little, supranote 240.
244 See, e.g., Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923-24 (2018) (plaintiffs argued that
a new districting plan resulted in wasted votes that violated the plaintiffs' Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection and their First Amendment right of association).
245 Id. at 1930-31 (discussing plaintiff's argument that new redistricting plan
causes dilution of votes).
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or campaigns on one side versus the other.246 In 2018, the Court
again declined to resolve the issues.247 This time, without even
reaching the merits, the Court said that the challengers had no
standing to complain about the statewide disparities in district
outcomes because the plaintiffs had not shown that their voting
power in their own districts had been diluted.248 For instance, the
lead plaintiff lived in a heavily Democratic district and was not
directly harmed by the statewide disparities.249 So, once again the
Court kicked this particular can down the road. But the net effect
was the deferral and, for now, the denial of First Amendment
claims of electoral redistricting political punishment and
discrimination for party affiliation and allegiance. That's the
second "loss" for the First Amendment.
Censorship by Cable Television Channels

C.

The third First Amendment loss involved whether a
private, nonprofit company, hired by New York City to operate
the government-mandated public access channels of a privatelyowned cable television system, was subject to the limitations of
the First Amendment.250 Two film producers made a
documentary critical of the way the nonprofit company running
the public access channels covered a minority community.21 The
nonprofit channel permitted the critical documentary to be
shown but received many complaints about it and also got into
disputes about future programming with the two producers.252
As a result, the nonprofit suspended one producer and barred
the other indefinitely.253 Both producers sued the nonprofit,
claiming its actions were the functional equivalent of
government censorship and violated their rights under the free
speech clause of the First Amendment. 25 4

246 Redistrictingand the Supreme Court: The Most Significant Cases, NAT'L CoNF.
ST. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 14, 2021), https-/www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/
redistricting-and-the-supreme-court-the-most-significant-cases.aspx [https://perma.cc/54YU7M2V]; see also Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Avoids An Answer on PartisanGerrymandering,
N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2018), httpsJ/www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/us/politics/supreme-courtwisconsin-maryland-gerrymander-vote.html [https://perma.cc/2VVG-ARHH].
247
See Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1929.
248 Id. at 1928-32.
249 Id. at 1931-34.
250 Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019).
251 Id. at 1927.
252

Id.

253

Id.
See id. at 1926-27.
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The case
was
decided
5-4 along traditional
conservative/liberal fault lines against the First Amendment
claims.255 Justice Kavanaugh wrote for the Court:
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment constrains
governmental actors and protects private actors. To draw the line
between governmental and private, this Court applies what is known as
the state-action doctrine. Under that doctrine, as relevant here, a private
entity may be considered a state actor when it exercises a function
"traditionally exclusively reserved to the State."

Under the state-action doctrine as it has been articulated and
applied by our precedents, we conclude that operation of public access
channels on a cable system is not a traditional, exclusive public function.
Moreover, a private entity such as MNN [Manhattan Neighborhood
Network, the private, non-profit cable television operator,] who opens its
property for speech by others is not transformed by that fact alone into a
state actor. In operating the public access channels, MNN is a private
actor, not a state actor, and MNN therefore is not subject to First
Amendment constraints on its editorial discretion. 256

Thus, the private, nonprofit public access channel operator was
not the government and therefore was not subject to the
limitations of the First Amendment.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, in an opinion joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan.27 In her view, because the
city has a property interest in the cable channels, and the state's
regulations require that the public be given access to the channels,
the public-access channels are indeed a government-like public
forum.28 Accordingly, the First Amendment was applicable, and
the nonprofit company that runs the public access channel is
subject to the commands of the First Amendment as though it were
the government. 2 9 "Just as the City would have been subject to the
First Amendment had it chosen to run the forum itself, MNN
assumed the same responsibility when it accepted the delegation"
to run the channels.260
Two things are worth noting about the decision. First, be
careful what you wish for. Do we really want private speakers and
publishers to be subject to equal access and other demands that are
properly imposed upon government by the First Amendment?

265

See id. at 1925, 1932.

256

Id. at 1926.

257

Id. at 1934 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

258

Id.
Id. at 1944.
Id. at 1936.

259
260
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Many Supreme Court cases suggest otherwise.261 Indeed, Justice
Kavanaugh warned about just such a consequence at the end of his
majority opinion:
It is sometimes said that the bigger the government, the smaller the
individual. Consistent with the text of the Constitution, the state-action
doctrine enforces a critical boundary between the government and the
individual, and thereby protects a robust sphere of individual liberty.
Expanding the state-action doctrine beyond its traditional boundaries
would expand governmental control while restricting individual liberty
26 2
and private enterprise. We decline to do so in this case.

Second, there is an irresistible irony on the horizon, as
noted previously. At this writing, former President Donald
Trump has filed suit against the Big Three Tech GiantsFacebook, Google's YouTube, and Twitter-essentially claiming
that they have subjected him and his supporters to
unconstitutional systematic censorship in violation of the First
Amendment.23 Of course, those three entities, despite their
enormous size and power over our lives, are private companies.

In the first round of commentary about the lawsuits, many First
Amendment supporters insisted that the suit was frivolous
24
because the First Amendment only limited government. Ironic
that the support for this point of view comes from the
Kavanaugh opinion for the conservatives on the Court, and the
support for former President Trump's claims against those
powerful private censors probably will be drawn from the liberal
justices' dissenting opinion.265

261 See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114-21
(1983) (government may not compel broadcasters to accept paid editorial advertisements);
Mia. Herald Publ'g. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243, 258 (1974) (states may not require
newspapers to grant political candidates free space to reply to character attacks by the
newspapers); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557,
572-81 (1995) (states may not require private citizens organizing a public march to include
groups conveying messages that organizers do not want to convey).
262 Manhattan Cmty. Access, 139 S. Ct. at 1934.
See Complaint, Trump v. Facebook, No. 1-21-cv-22440 (S.D. Fla. July 7,
263
2021). The complaint for the class action suit filed in the Southern District of Florida
was styled: Donald J. Trump et al. v. Facebook, Inc., and Mark Zuckerberg, Case 1-21cv-22440-XXXX (S.D. Fla. 2021). Similar class action complaints were filed separately
against Google, Donald J. Trump et al. v. YouTube, LLC, and Sundar Pichai, Case 1-21cv-61384-XXXX (S.D. Fla. 2021); and Twitter, Donald J. Trump et al. v. Twitter, Inc.,
and Jack Dorsey, Case 1-21-cv-22441-XXXX (S.D. Fla. 2021).
See Bender & Needleman, supra note 160 (quoting legendary First
264
Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams who "called Mr. Trump's suits against the three
platforms 'irredeemably frivolous' and said that Section 230 of the Communications Act
provides social-media outlets with more protection than the First Amendment requires").
See Ramaswamy, supra note 161; Adam Liptak, Trump Suits Against Tech
265
Giants Face Steep First Amendment Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2021), https//www.
nytimes.com/2021/07/12/us/politics/trump-tech-lawsuits.html [httpsJ/perma.cc/6WHC-TBUL.
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FirstAmendment Rights Abroad

The final case in the loss column is similar to the cable
access case in that it involves the Court's refusal to reach and
apply the First Amendment to the challenged censorship in
this case not because it was not the product of "state action,"
but because it was directed at a foreigner abroad.266 But the
First Amendment claim was again turned away, and, once
again, in an opinion for the five conservative justices written
by Justice Kavanaugh.267
The case involved congressional funding conditions and
requirements imposed on organizations receiving funds to fight
HIV/AIDS.268 To get the funding, they were required to adopt a
policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.269
Several years earlier, the Roberts Court held that condition to
be an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment as
applied to American organizations.270
The American organizations then challenged the
application of the requirement to their legally distinct foreign
affiliates. This time, the Court held that, since foreigners abroad
traditionally are not afforded First Amendment rights, the
policy as applied to them cannot violate the First Amendment.271
The Court's opinion, in a rather dogmatic fashion, reasoned that
since foreign citizens or entities outside the United States
generally do not possess US constitutional rights, including
those protected by the First Amendment, and since these foreign
affiliates were separately incorporated distinct legal entities,
they could not piggyback on the clear rights of their American
counterparts. 272 There was unanimous agreement that foreign
agencies and entities had no First Amendment rights, but the
question and much of the disagreement concerned the exact
relationship between the domestic and foreign entities in this
case and whether they were separate enough to impose the no
First Amendment rights rule on the latter.273 But, again, like in
the cable case, the Court did not apply the First Amendment in

266

2089 (2020).

See Agency for Int'l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2082,
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Id. at 2084.
Id. at 2085-86.
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Id.
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See Agency for Int'l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205,
217-21 (2013).
271 See Agency for Int'l Dev., 140 S. Ct. at 2089.
272 Id. at 2086-88.
273 Id. at 2088-89; id. at 2090-91, 2095 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
270
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a weak or watered down way; it did not apply it at all.274 One
possible explanation is the deference to the conduct of foreign
affairs, similar to the analysis in the case holding that the First
Amendment did not protect giving peaceful, nonviolent
"material support" to terrorist organizations.27
CONCLUSION

Five years ago, when I assayed the free speech work of
the Roberts Court in its first decade, I strongly supported and
applauded its generally strong protection for free speech and
related rights. But there were two causes for concern. First, the
increasingly hostile audience that was criticizing and attacking
the Court for what I thought were noble accomplishments.276
These critics, on and off the Court, essentially said that the
Court's overprotection of free speech was not only not
praiseworthy but was harming our public policy and our
democracy. If anything, that criticism, indeed hostility, has
intensified in the five intervening years. Robert Corn-Revere's
article in this symposium issue does an excellent job of surveying
and refuting the key attacks on the Roberts Court's free speech
work and showing that at bottom many such attacks are
essentially no different from old fashion censorship of ideas and
topics we do not like.277 For the reasons in this paper, I share Mr.
Corn-Revere's support for vigorous protection of free speech. And
I think we have seen some measured pushback from some of the
justices gently extolling the overriding values of protecting free
speech against government censorship.

The other concern I expressed five years ago was for the
deep disconnect between the Court's strong affirmation of the
indispensable values of free speech and the amount of
censorship in everyday life.278 Sad to say, I think that situation
has become much worse. We have experienced an epidemic of
censorship from public but more dangerously from private
sources. People on the left complain of laws that would censor
the doctrines of Critical Race Theory or outlaw protest tactics
often used by groups like Black Lives Matter.279 People on the
Id. at 2089 (majority

opinion).
Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 4, 39-40 (2010).
276 Gora, supra note 2, at 69-72.
277 See Corn-Revere, supranote 46, at 145-47, 155, 171-72.
278 See Gora, supra note 2, at 123-29.
See, e.g., Jonathan Friedman & James Tager, Educational Gag Orders: Legislative
279
Restrictions on the Freedom to Read, Learn, and Teach, PEN AMERICA, httpsJ/pen.org/reportl
educational-gag-orders/ [httpsJ/perma.cc/Z4MA-S7R9] (making the case that legislative efforts
to restrict teaching of Critical Race Theory and other "divisive" concepts threaten free speech);
274
276
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right point to the censorship by Big Tech of former President
Trump and other right wing voices who take issue with the
mainstream narratives on climate, COVID-19, and other current
issues.20 From pre-K to 401(K), there are rules that dramatically
govern our speech. They are driven in considerable part by
antidiscrimination laws which, though designed to prevent
discriminatory conduct, often interdict offensive, albeit arguably
protected, speech. As the scope of such rules broadens, the scope
of protected speech diminishes. And while many of these
restraints on speech emanate from governmental statutory or
regulatory mandates, many are self-inflicted by institutions
without explicit government compulsion. The systemic
censorship monitored and enforced by the social media giants is
exhibit A these days. And while courts, like the Roberts Court,
can impose considerable constitutional restraints on censorship
implemented or imposed by the government, that which
originates in private sources is not as readily subject to
constitutional constraints though it might be violative of
statutory or case law. Five years ago, I suggested, to paraphrase

the famous Judge Learned Hand passage, that the ultimate
salvation for free speech would not come from constitutions or
courts, but could only be generated in the hearts of people.281
What we need is to establish, or perhaps reestablish, a
"culture of free speech."282 People of a certain age learned the
core principle for such a culture on the playground decades ago,
where the smart response to a mean remark or epithet was:
"Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words can never
harm me." Today, people who say forbidden taboo words or
express disfavored ideas are sometimes met with physical sticks
Kia Rahnama, How the Supreme Court Dropped the Ball on the Right to Protest, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 17, 2020, 5:28 PM), https:/www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/08/17/portlandcrackdown-freedom-of-assembly-supreme-court-397191 [https://perma.cc/8NYQ-WL6Y]
(discussing the "failure" of the Supreme Court to protect First Amendment rights of protestors).
280
See, e.g., Hudson, supra note 146 (citing examples of censorship including
Facebook's ability to control speech on its site and even the NFL's reaction to players "taking
a knee" during the national anthem at football games); Corynne McSherry et al., Private
CensorshipIs Not the Best Way to Fight Hate or Defend Democracy: Here Are Some Better
30,
2018),
FOUND.
(Jan.
Ideas,
ELECTRO IC
FRONTIER
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/01/private-censorship-not-best-way-fight-hate-or-defenddemocracy-here-are-some [https://perma.cc/S2UE-LRUKI (discussing growth in '"voluntary'
platform censorship"); Tom Spiggle, Why Social Media Companies Can Censor Trump, and
Why Your Boss Can Censor You, FORBES (Jan. 12, 2021, 11:43 AM),
httpsJl/www.forbes.com/sites/tomspiggle/2021/01/12/why-social-media-companies-can-censortrump-and-why-your-boss-can-censor-youfsh=389f8267b79 [https://perma.cc/W9GP-CHG3]
(explaining how private employers and social media companies can censor individuals).
281 Gora, supranote 2, at 125-28.
282 See Robert Tracinski, We Need More than the First Amendment, We Need a
'Culture of Free Speech', DISCOURSE MAG., (June 14, 2021), https://rb.gy/mrjd0g
[https://perma.cc/B2JE-YCCS].
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in response. But such speakers today are more often met with
Twitter storms of condemnation, social media calumniation, and
the omnipresent threat of cancellation. What a culture of free
speech would privilege is the opposite: namely, rebuttal and
response, discussion and debate, diversity of thought, ideas and
ideology, and facts and information. It was best put by one of our
most famous presidents:
Americans have fought and died around the globe to protect the
right of all people to express their views, even views that we
profoundly disagree with. We do not do so because we support hateful
speech, but because our founders understood that without such
protections, the capacity of each individual to express their own views
and practice their own faith may be threatened. We do so because in
a diverse society, efforts to restrict speech can quickly become a tool
to silence critics and oppress minorities.
We do so because given the power of faith in our lives, and the
passion that religious differences can inflame, the strongest weapon
against hateful speech is not repression; it is more speech-the voices
of tolerance that rally against bigotry and blasphemy, and lift up the
283
values of understanding and mutual respect.

That is from a speech by then-President Barack Obama given to
the United Nations.284.

- Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President to the UN
General Assembly (Sept. 25, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/09/25/remarks-president-un-general-assembly [https://perma.cd/9N7M-LJF9].
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